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Costly Intellectual Property
David Fagundes* and Jonathan S. Masur†‡
ABSTRACT
Though they derive from the same constitutional source of law, patents and
copyrights vest very differently. Patents arise only after an applicant successfully
navigates a cumbersome and expensive examination, while copyrights arise
costlessly upon mere fixation of a work in a tangible medium of expression. Each of
these vesting systems has drawn much criticism. Some scholars argue that the patent
examination system imposes heavy costs while failing to eliminate invalid patents.
Each of these claims, though, fails to take into account the social benefits (or costs)
associated with the screening mechanism (or lack thereof) required for owners to
perfect their rights. The social-welfare implications of process costs have been
studied in other settings, but largely ignored in the intellectual property (IP)
literature. In this Article, we leverage the insights of this literature to craft a novel
theory showing why the much-maligned patent and copyright vesting systems are
actually socially beneficial. Our analysis rests on a descriptive account of how
patents and copyrights create differential social and private values, and shows that
costly screens select differently across the classes of value in each of these cases, so
that process costs are warranted in the patent setting but undesirable for copyright.
Finally, we abstract the insights of this paper to generate two more general insights
about law. First, we illustrate how this analysis of costly screens generates a broader
account of how law does and should govern processes for vesting IP rights. In so
doing, we offer a novel and unified theory of IP process. Second, we explore how
our discussion of process costs in the IP setting illuminates the underappreciated
benefits and costs of screens in other areas of law.
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INTRODUCTION
Patents and copyrights originate from the same constitutional
source of law,1 and for this reason they are in some respects similar.
Patent and copyright law alike extend to inventors and authors
exclusive rights over the fruits of their intellectual labors, enabling
owners to extract value from intangible goods that would not
otherwise not be profitable.2 Both systems are premised on a
utilitarian bargain, allowing inventors and authors to have socially
costly monopoly interests in their inventions and works in order to
encourage socially beneficial innovative and artistic production.3 And
patents and copyrights both last only for finite periods, in contrast to
the perpetuity of most property interests, expiring at some time after
their vesting to enrich the public domain and enable creation of
follow-on inventions and works of authorship.4
Yet in at least one salient respect,5 patents and copyrights are
quite different. Patents vest only after an applicant successfully
navigates a cumbersome examination process administered by the
federal Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Copyrights, by contrast,
arise costlessly and often unintentionally, as soon as an author fixes a
work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression.6 Patents, in
other words, are very costly to acquire, while acquiring a copyright
cost authors almost nothing at all.
That patents and copyrights vest so differently raises a
problem, and presents a puzzle. The problem—at least purportedly—
1

U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have the Power … To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
2
35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (enumerating exclusive rights of patent owners); 17
U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating six exclusive rights of copyright owners).
3
Dastar Corp. v. 20th Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (“The
rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain under
which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the
invention or work at will and without attribution”).
4
35 U.S.C. § 154 (establishing patent duration of 20 years from effective date of
filing); 17 U.S.C. § 302 (establishing a term of 70 years after the death of the author
for most copyrights).
5
Of course, patent and copyright differ in many other respects. For example,
patent law extends to inventors broader exclusive rights than copyright law extends
to authors, a point that we return to in detail below. See Parts II & III, infra.
6
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”).
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is that each of these vesting systems generates social costs far in
excess of its benefits. Critics of the patent system charge that the
examination process represents a classic deadweight loss, imposing
prohibitive costs on patentees while generating no offsetting benefits
by screening out invalid or ineffectual patents.7 Critics of the
copyright system charge that by extending exclusive rights to just
about any work of authorship, society suffers from a glut of copyrights
that deters future creation by imposing information and transaction
costs on would-be authors.8
In this Article, we question this conventional wisdom, arguing
that the costliness of patents and the costlessness of copyrights have
positive, rather than negative, effects on social welfare. The first step
of our argument leverages emergent insights from the economic
literature about costly screening processes. As scholars have observed
in other settings, burdensome processes for vesting legal rights have
social costs and benefits apart from the substantive end they are meant
to serve. Such processes are costly screens, forcing actors who seek to
acquire legal rights to consider whether acquisition of the right will be
worth the cost of doing so. Such screens cause actors to self-select
against acquisition of rights that will not generate much private value,
and limit the vesting of those rights for reasons unrelated to the
substantive content of the process itself.
Bringing this insight to bear on IP casts the vesting of both
patents and copyrights in a new light. The much-maligned patent
examination process functions as a classic costly screen. It deters
applicants from seeking patents when the value of the exclusive right
is less than the price of overcoming the screen. Moreover, because of
a distinctive asymmetry in patent law’s generation of social and
private value, the effect of this screen is to deter the production only of
those low private value patents that also have low (or negative) social
value. Examined in this light, the costly examination process is not a

7

See generally, e.g., DAN BURK & MARK LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (critiquing the current patent vesting
system).
8
See, e.g., Molly Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549 (2010) (arguing that “atomistic copyright causes
information and transaction cost problems”); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or
Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575 (2005) (observing that
copyright law increasingly protects smaller “microworks”, and that this trend is
problematic).
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deadweight loss at all, but an efficient way to exclude the very kind of
patents most likely to generate anticommons concerns.
Process costs—or, more accurately, their absence—also help
explain why copyright’s oft-criticized low vesting threshold generates
social benefits in ways unappreciated by its critics. Because copyright
law constructs authors’ property rights differently—and much more
narrowly—than patent law constructs property rights, it produces very
different private/social value asymmetries. If law were to impose a
costly screen as a precondition of copyright vesting, such a screen
would exact social costs well in excess of any benefits it produced.
Costly copyrights would preclude the creation of only innocuous
works of authorship, thereby failing to generate any meaningful social
value. Process costs for copyright vesting would, however, deter the
creation of works that have low value for their author but high value
for public—thus precluding production of one of the paradigmatic
kinds of work that copyright was designed to create.
Refracting the patent and copyright vesting systems through
the lens of costly screen theory thus enables us to tell a very different
story than the one currently animating most writing on this topic.
Rather than regarding the patent examination process (and the lack of
any process for acquiring copyrights) as social problems, we show that
they are in fact beneficial ways to maximize social welfare from IP
production.
But application of costly screen theory not only reconfigures
the conventional normative account of vesting IP rights, it also
provides a solution to a longstanding, related puzzle. Scholars have
often asked why law creates such different vesting thresholds for
copyrights and patents. This question has often been addressed in the
literature, but without a satisfactory conclusion. We argue that costly
screens provide a complete and parsimonious answer to this puzzle,
and indeed that this allows us to craft more generally a theory of IP
process that reveals an essential relationship between the breadth of an
exclusive right in information and the socially optimal means by
which that right should vest. Our answer to this problem does not
rely, as other accounts have, on the mere fact that copyrights and
patents extend differential strengths of property rights to owners.
Rather, we suggest that there is a complex interrelationship between
the breadth of exclusive rights in information, the social/private value
asymmetries those rights generate, and the optimal process that should
govern how those rights vest. Indeed, we claim that this insight may
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be abstracted to the law more generally, and conclude by briefly
examining related fields where costly screen theory can make sense of
a purportedly suboptimal process (or the purportedly suboptimal lack
of such a process).
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the
essentials of costly screen analysis, providing a basis for the discussion
that follows. Part II applies these ideas in the patent setting, arguing
that the supposedly wasteful patent examination process actually
enhances social welfare because it encourages efficient self-selection
by patentees. Part III makes a similar move in the context of
copyrights, showing by means of a counterfactual thought experiment
that imposition of costly screens as a prerequisite to vesting exclusive
rights in works of authorship would be counterproductive because it
would preclude the creation of many highly socially valuable works.
Part IV generalizes these insights in two ways. First, it articulates a
general theory of IP process that illuminates a basic relationship
between the statutory construction of exclusive rights in information
and the means by which those rights should vest. Second, it
extrapolates our argument outside the IP context, showing that
elaborate processes (or the conspicuous lack of any such process) for
vesting legal rights may be socially beneficial in ways that their critics
have failed to appreciate.
I.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF COSTLY SCREENS

Costly screens—which we define as the price that an actor
must pay to the government in order to take a given action—are
ubiquitous. If you want to (legally) drive a car, you have to get a
license from the local DMV, remitting the requisite fees and
successfully undergoing a basic competency evaluation. Owners who
want to develop or significantly modify their real property must seek
permits from and pay fees to the relevant local building authority.
Similarly, operators of businesses must comply with federal
regulations that often impose permit requirements on concerns likely
to produce noxious effluents. Many, and possibly most, activities that
may impose large-scale externalities require their agents to navigate a
costly screen in one way or another.9
9

There are conspicuous exceptions. People—or at least women—are free to
have children absent any licensing requirement, and regardless of their parental
fitness.
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These screens are often understood in terms of the content of
the processes themselves. Licensing requirements evaluate driver skill
to assure that the streets are not crowded with dangerously
incompetent motorists. Permitting requirements for construction
encourage compliance with building codes designed to ensure safety,
while similar requirements for manufacturing encourage compliance
with federal regulations designed to reduce pollution. Yet this
standard account cannot explain all aspects of such screening
processes. Requiring payment of a license or permit fee merely raises
the costs of acquiring these rights, and does not appear to have any
nexus with driver competence or building safety. And many screening
processes have been shown to lack any meaningful substantive bite,10
so that they more closely resemble a byzantine bureaucratic maze than
a serious evaluation of an actor’s competence or safety.
In light of the shortcomings of this standard explanation, an
alternative account—which we refer to throughout this Article as
costly screen theory—has emerged.11 Its exponents, increasingly
numerous in the legal academy, have argued that cumbersome
procedural requirements have social value not because of their
substantive accuracy, but simply because some actors cannot afford to
pay the price associated with these costly screens, and are thus
precluded from acquiring the associated rights. So long as costly
screens select against those actors whose exercise of the right at issue
will be socially counterproductive, such screens enhance aggregate
welfare value regardless of the substance of the process that they
impose.12
10

We discuss several of these types of processes below. See infra Part IV.B.
Scholars have applied costly screen theory in various legal settings. See, e.g.,
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006); Hans Gersbach, The Money-Burning
Refinement: With an Application to a Political Signaling Game, 33 INT’L J. GAME
THEORY 67 (2004); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1160–61
(2001); Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Sorting out the Differences Between
Screening and Signaling Models, in PAPERS IN COMMEMORATION OF THE ECONOMIC
THEORY SEMINAR AT OXFORD UNIVERSITY (Michael Dempster, ed.) (1989); Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality, 94 J.
Pol. Econ. 796 (1986); Michael A. Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUART. J.
ECON. 561 (1973).
12
Indeed, costly screen theory is agnostic as to the content of the screen itself.
A fee in the amount of X on actors is functionally equivalent to a process that
requires no fee but imposes transaction costs equivalent to X.
11
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To illustrate how costly screens can affect and sometimes
enhance the production of goods, consider an imaginary firm called
DouglasCo.13 DouglasCo manufactures a product called Bairds, but
its manufacturing process also generates social costs in the form of
pollution.14 Society thus wants DouglasCo to manufacture Bairds, but
only when their production enhances social welfare—that is, only
when the private value of producing Bairds (i.e., the profits they
generate for DouglasCo) exceeds the social costs of their production
(i.e., pollution). The problem, though, is that DouglasCo cannot be
counted on to limit its production by reference to this calculus,
because its production operates independently of any aggregate social
welfare analysis. DouglasCo will continue to manufacture Bairds
whenever they create private value for the firm, because it does not, by
assumption, bear the social costs of its pollution.15
Now imagine that a government actor, Regulator, is charged
with addressing this problem. How can Regulator limit instances in
which DouglasCo’s production of Bairds produces a socially harmful
amount of pollution? Regulator would love to simply ban production
where the social costs of producing Bairds are greater than the private
value they create, but it cannot, because the private value of making
Bairds is a fact known only to DouglasCo.
Costly screens may provide a solution to this difficulty.
Regulator could simply impose on DouglasCo a price—say, a permit
fee—in order to obtain the right to produce Bairds. If the permit fee is
greater than the private value that DouglasCo generates by producing
Bairds, then DouglasCo will simply cease production. Where
DouglasCo’s manufacture of Bairds creates more pollution than it
does private value, then Regulator’s imposition of a costly screen to
stymie the firm’s production is a welfare-maximizing outcome. But
there is no guarantee that the costly screen will block DouglasCo from
producing Bairds in all cases when producing Bairds is welfarediminishing, and no guarantee that the costly screen will not block
DouglasCo from producing Bairds when producing Bairds is welfareenhancing.
Regulator’s costly screen will stop DouglasCo’s
13

Thanks to our mentor and colleague Douglas Baird for tolerating our use of
his name in connection with this hypothetical.
14
We make the simplifying assumption that the only social cost exacted by
DouglasCo’s production of Bairds is pollution. In reality, the social costs of
producing any good are much more varied.
15
In more formal lingo, we’d say that the social costs of DouglasCo’s
manufacture Bairds is not internalized.
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production whenever the screen makes production of Bairds a losing
proposition for the firm, including even those instances where
production creates no pollution.16 The fundamental problem is that
DouglasCo will react based on how the costly screen compares to the
private value of producing Bairds, while Regulator really cares about
the social value of producing Bairds, which depends on the amount of
pollution generated.
Given this mismatch, is it ever possible for Regulator to
impose costly screens in a way that is likely to enhance social welfare?
We think the answer is yes, and in order to illustrate how, we
introduce one more variation to this extended hypothetical. Assume
that DouglasCo makes two kinds of Bairds, A and B. Imagine that
Baird A earns DouglasCo significant profits and usually (but not
always) results in relatively little pollution. In other words, making
Baird A is always a winning proposition for DouglasCo and often (but
not always) a winning proposition for society at large. Baird B, by
contrast, earns DouglasCo much less by way of profit, but invariably
generates significant pollution. In other words, making Baird B is
(barely) a winning proposition for DouglasCo, but is always a losing
proposition for society. Let’s assume further that Regulator has no
idea beforehand whether DouglasCo is making Baird A or Baird B,
even after the goods have hit the marketplace. (This may seem like a
contrived set of circumstances, but we will demonstrate later that a
great proportion of intellectual property actually does have these
features.)
Under these circumstances, Regulator can use costly screens to
exploit the asymmetry between the private value that the Bairds create
for DouglasCo and the public value that they generate for society at
large. As we have seen, Baird A sometimes creates social benefits and
sometimes does not, but it always generates value for DouglasCo. By
contrast, Baird B is always harmful to society, and only sometimes
generates value for DouglasCo.17 So, if Regulator can at least
16

The story is actually a little bit more complicated, because the imposition of
the screen itself is a social cost that must be reflected in the cost-benefit analysis, so
the screen is desirable only where the private value of making Bairds exceeds both
the pollution generated by the manufacturing process and the cost to DouglasCo of
navigating the screen.
17
One might wonder why DouglasCo would bother making Baird B at all, since
Baird A is consistently more profitable for the firm. It may do so because Baird A is
difficult to produce, and cannot be generated with any regularity. While this may
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determine the value that Baird B creates for DouglasCo, it can set a
costly screen priced at, or slightly above, that value. This screen will
make it so that DouglasCo will no longer produce Baird B (since the
screen would cost more than the profits generated by that good), but
will not preclude production of Baird A (since the profits from making
Baird A remain greater than the costs imposed by the screen). Here,
then, Regulator’s costly screen is welfare-enhancing, because it blocks
production of a socially costly good while continuing to allow
production of a (frequently) socially beneficial one.18
Consider as well this variation: What if production of Baird B,
despite its marginal profitability for DouglasCo, sometimes led to
massive pollution while at other times creating no pollution at all?
This small change alters the result entirely. Here, imposing a costly
screen would still preclude DouglasCo from making highly polluting
and therefore socially costly versions of Baird B, but would also
preclude the firm from making non-polluting and therefore socially
beneficial versions of Baird B. Under these conditions, Regulator
could no longer conclude that imposing costly screens on DouglasCo’s
production of Bairds would likely be welfare enhancing. If the “good”
Baird Bs outnumbered the “bad” Baird Bs, it would be a mistake to
block their production entirely.
This highly abstracted example illustrates how processes
imposed by government in advance of exercising a given right can
generate social value independently of the content of the process itself.
The extended hypothetical we have sketched here, while highly
abstract, describes two major areas of intellectual property law—
patent and copyright—and lays the foundation for showing how the
processes for vesting each of these rights are best understood as costly
screens. We take up this argument in the sections that follow.

seem odd, we will demonstrate that this too is a feature common to copyrights and
patents.
18
The costly screen clearly does not create a perfect world where DouglasCo
produces Baird A only when that production is socially beneficial. The screen will
permit all production of Baird A, which by assumption will include some instances
in which that production will be socially costly. We illustrate here only that costly
screens can represent Pareto-improvements, not that they necessarily eliminate all
social problems.
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COSTLY PATENTS

For patent applicants, the process of patent examination is
costly. The average patent applicant will pay more than $20,000 to
obtain a patent, and that figure can be much higher for patents in
complex technological fields. At the same time, examination does not
reliably weed out the worst patents. Patent examiners have significant
private incentives to grant even invalid patents and little incentive to
block them. Examiners are also able to devote only a short amount of
time to examining each patent. Even the procedural rules governing
patent examinations are stacked against denials. Consequently, patent
attorneys have come to believe that they can push through nearly any
patent application with continuous appeals and re-filings. These
improperly granted patents can exact social costs, dissuading firms
from entering into markets or commercializing inventions and
clogging the processes of innovation.
If patent examination is both expensive and ineffective, why
continue it? In light of these twin failings, scholars have proposed two
types of systemic reforms. Some advocate investing greater resources
in more extensive examination by the PTO.19 Others, pointing to the
large percentage of patents that are economically insignificant, suggest
scaling back (or even eliminating) the PTO examination process and
moving towards a system of (free) patent registration and ex post
review in the courts, much like copyright.20 Both groups, however,
treat the expenditures involved in prosecuting a patent solely as the
cost of the active examination that takes place, to be minimized
wherever possible.
In this section, we present a novel conception of the role of
PTO process in deterring the filing of bad patents. Examination
procedures at the patent office impose private costs on patent
applicants. These procedural costs act as a costly screen, dissuading
putative patent holders from filing for patent rights that they expect
will be worth little—we call them “low private value” patents.
Because of the structure of patent rights, these low private value
inventions will necessarily be harmful, not beneficial, to society at
large. That is, they will have “low social value” as well.21
19

See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
21
Importantly, the converse is not true. A patent with low private value will
have low social value, but a patent with low social value will not necessarily have
20
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Consequently, the PTO’s costly screen will block only harmful
patents; it will not deter innovators from creating genuinely useful
inventions. There is thus reason to believe that patent examination
costs are useful simply because they select against socially harmful
patents while leaving beneficial ones unscathed.
A.

Patent Costs

Stories of ridiculous, invalid, and obvious patents have become
commonplace.22 In recent years the PTO has gained infamy for
allowing patents on a stick, the process of toasting bread, and a
method for swinging on a swing, to name just a few examples.23 Far
more importantly, however, the PTO has granted invalid patents on
thousands, if not tens of thousands, of “inventions” in innovative fields
such as software, biotechnology, and electronics.24 These patents, on
inventions that would have been obvious to scientists in the field or
were anticipated by prior work, carry with them the potential to stifle
innovation and discourage firms from entering into productive
markets. Even if they are never litigated—indeed, especially if they
are never litigated, and are never evaluated in court—these “bad”
patents impose significant costs on consumers and producers in
precisely those industries in which rapid technological progression and
the growth of small-scale market participants are most important.
Patentees will always seek to obtain even invalid patents
because they can be used to collect licensing fees and block
competitors. But these types of patents are allowed to come into
existence only because of the inadequacies and pathologies of the
procedures employed by the patent office to screen them out. Unlike
nearly every other federal agency, the patent office treats the private
parties with whom it interacts—patent applicants—as its

low private value. We describe and analyze this phenomenon in the section that
follows. See infra Section II.B. This section and the next draw and expand upon
Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. Legal Analysis 687
(2010).
22
See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).
23
See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3233 (2004) (enumerating examples of these worthless and obvious patents).
24
See id. at 37.
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“customers,”25 and describes its mission as “help[ing] our customers
get patents” and “ensur[ing] strong intellectual property for all
Americans.”26 This is not exactly a skeptical stance. Nor is it mere
rhetoric. Rather, this view of the PTO’s institutional role manifests
itself in the procedures that the office has created to process
applications and the incentives placed upon the key actors within the
system, the patent examiners.
Each patent application filed with the PTO is referred to a
single patent examiner, who maintains authority over the application
during nearly its entire life.27 The examiner must decide whether to
grant or reject the patent application. Yet these two activities are not
symmetric. Rejecting a patent application is more difficult and timeconsuming for the examiner than granting one. If the examiner grants
the application, there is little process required—the examiner simply
announces that she is allowing the application to mature into a patent.
If the examiner rejects the patent, however, she must justify that
decision and identify the relevant prior documents and the section of
the Patent Act that has caused her to reject the application.28
Patent examiners receive salary bonuses based on the number
of patent applications that they are able to process.29 This fact, by
itself, might skew the examiner’s incentives—granting a patent is
easier than rejecting one. But the problem is in fact far greater.
25

See, e.g., WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE
REVIEW
(1994
Annual
Review),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1994/pg1-5.pdf. This is in contrast to
other administrative organizations, such as prosecutors’ offices, that structure
internal cultures and incentives so as to mitigate the effect of rational self-interest.
Prosecutors themselves have an incentive to dismiss cases or settle them quickly, for
short sentences, in order to dispose of their workload and maximize leisure time.
Prosecutors’ offices counter this incentive by creating cultures that value longer
sentences and higher conviction rates and evaluating line prosecutors on those
grounds. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 17 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
26
A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1997/;
WORKING
FOR
OUR
CUSTOMERS: A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW (1994 Annual Review),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1994/pg1-5.pdf.
27
ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 48-54 (2007).
28
37 CFR § 1.104(a)(2) (2007) (“The reasons for any adverse action or any
objection or requirement will be stated in an Office action . . . .”).
29
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 12, at 116 (describing the internal functioning of
the PTO).
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Unlike a patent grant, an examiner’s decision to reject a patent
application does not end the matter. First, the patent examiner cannot
issue a “final” rejection on the first go-around.30 If the examiner
initially rejects the patent, the applicant is entitled to request a reexamination in front of the same examiner.31 After this second
examination, the examiner may choose to issue a “final” rejection of
the application, though she need not do so.32 (In theory, the examiner
and the applicant could engage in an infinitely iterated series of
preliminary rejections and re-examinations, and indeed many patents
are the subject of three or four office actions before they are finally
accepted or rejected.33) Yet even if the examiner issues a final
rejection of an application, the matter is not closed. If the applicant
does not wish to abandon the invention, she may file a continuation
application.34 The patent application remains before the same
examiner as if the “final rejection” had not been genuinely effective,
and the examiner does not receive credit towards her bonus.
Moreover, there is no limit to the number of continuation
applications that an applicant may file.35 If the applicant is willing to
30

37 C.F.R. § 1.111(a)(1) (2007).
35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2007).
32
37 CFR § 1.113(a) (2007) (“On the second or any subsequent examination or
consideration by the examiner the rejection or other action may be made final . . . .)
(emphasis added).
33
This estimate is based upon conversations with patent prosecutors at a number
of law firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on
file with author.
34
35 U.S.C. § 120 (2007). The applicant can also appeal the decision directly to
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), which can overturn the
examiner’s decision and send the patent back to the examiner for further
consideration. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2007). If the applicant loses before the BPAI, she
then holds the right to appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 141
(2007). The applicant may also bring a civil action in federal district court against
the director of the patent office, seeking essentially the same relief, though few
choose this route. Id. § 145.
35
The PTO recently attempted to impose an administrative limit on continuation
applications, see “Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent
Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in
Patent Applications,” 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1),
only to see its regulation struck down by a district court as inconsistent with the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2008). Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va.
2008). This decision was on appeal to the Federal Circuit when the PTO voluntarily
agreed to withdraw its new guidelines, mooting the case. See USPTO Rescinds
Controversial Patent Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration,
http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp.
31
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pay the necessary costs, the examiner has no way of rejecting the
application decisively.
The rational, self-interested examiner thus has a tremendous
incentive to grant the vast majority of patent applications.36 By
consequence, essentially all observers agree that the substantive
examination of patents at the PTO is of very poor quality.
The poor quality of patent examination is all the more galling in light
of its high cost. An initial patent application on a relatively complex
technology—a semiconductor or biotechnology patent, for instance—
will typically cost between $11,000 and $15,000 when prepared by a
reputable law firm.37 Once patent office fees38 and other attorneys’
costs are figured into the equation, an average patentee will spend
approximately $22,000 to successfully prosecute a patent
application.39
In response to the inadequacies of the patent office and the
costs of obtaining a patent, scholars have advanced a number of
proposals designed to shore up that failing agency and provide a more
36

This is in contrast to other administrative organizations, such as prosecutors’
offices, that structure internal cultures and incentives so as to mitigate the effect of
rational self-interest. Prosecutors themselves have an incentive to dismiss cases or
settle them quickly, for short sentences, in order to dispose of their workload and
maximize leisure time. Prosecutors’ offices counter this incentive by creating
cultures that value longer sentences and higher conviction rates and evaluating line
prosecutors on those grounds. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 17 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
37
Statement of Alan J. Kasper, First Vice President, American Intellectual
Property Law Association, Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and
Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of
Representatives, Oversight Hearing on the United States Patent and Trademark
Office,
February
27,
2008,
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Kasper080227.pdf, at 7. These figures were
confirmed in a number of independent conversations with attorneys at a variety of
law firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file
with authors.
38
The Patent Office charges a variety of small fees for prosecuting a patent.
See, e.g., C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(1), (k), (o) (filing fees); 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(2) (same); 37
C.F.R. § 1.18(a) (issuance fees); 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(1)(B) (same); 35 C.F.R. §
1.16(h), (i) (fees for claims); 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(j) (same).
39
This figure is based on calculations undertaken by the author based on a set of
representative patents. Notes are on file with the author and available upon request.
In 2001, Mark Lemley estimated the average cost at $10,000 to $30,000. Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2001)
(performing back-of-the-envelope calculations of patent costs). If anything, then, the
estimate here may be overly conservative.
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effective screen against non-novel and potentially harmful patents.
Some scholars have recommended increasing PTO funding in order to
enable the office to hire more examiners and spend a greater amount
of time on each patent.40 Another, smaller cadre has asserted that
patent examinations should be eliminated altogether, with the patent
system reverting to a simple system of registration akin to the
copyright regime.41
40

See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What do Patents Purchase? In Search
of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219 (2004); JAFFE &
LERNER, supra note 23 (proposing that the patent office expend greater funds on
more rigorous examination); Mark Lemley, Douglas Lichtman, & Bhaven Sampat,
What to do About Bad Patents?, 28 REGULATION 12–13 (2005); John R. Allison, On
the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The Case of
Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 729 (2006); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong.
(2007); see also Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing
greater allocations of funds for patent examination). Many of these proposals are
coupled with suggestions for meaningful inter partes post-grant administrative
review, mechanisms by which potential infringers can challenge a patent’s validity
without undertaking expensive litigation in federal courts. See Joseph Farrell &
Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation
Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 943 (2004); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23;
Lemley, supra note 22.
Some even recommend a multi-tiered system of patent review in which
applicants can opt for one of several levels of PTO scrutiny with correspondingly
strong ex post presumptions of validity. See, e.g., Lemley et al., supra (proposing an
increase in PTO fees as a means of funding more extensive patent examination);
Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for
Decreasing Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. L. REV. 119 (2005) (same);
Jaffe & Lerner, supra note 23 (same). Other commentators have suggested
heightened ex post renewal fees as a means of thinning the patent thicket, see, e.g.,
Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 27, at 18–22, but these increased fees would
impact only truly abandoned inventions and have no measurable effect on patents
destined for use in nuisance lawsuits.. And even more exotic proposals abound,
including suggestions for tradable patent rights that will limit the number of patents
in force at any given time by compelling patentees to bid on a finite pool of litigation
rights. Id. at 22-39. But see Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent
Races Over Auctions, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 803 (2007) (arguing that government is illsuited to determining when patent auctions should be held). These proposals for
inter partes or multi-tiered review are in many cases quite compelling, and the theory
set forth here can serve a complementary role to any or all of them.
41
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 953 (2007); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003).
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These assessments of the patent system share a common
feature: they treat the cost of obtaining a patent as simply the purchase
price for the substantive patent examination. The costs are viewed as
a necessary evil, worthwhile only to the extent that they make
substantive examination possible. Hence the view that if costs are
high and examination is largely ineffectual, the system should be
reformed.42 Accordingly, most scholars argue that patent costs should
be no higher than absolutely necessary to facilitate patent
examination—regardless of whether they believe there should be more
or less rigorous examination in the first place.43 None of these
approaches considers the possibility that the high cost of prosecuting a
patent might itself have a beneficial effect on the quality of patents
issued.
In fact, however, the cost of obtaining a patent serves an
important function: it screens out a significant number of harmful
intellectual property rights—patents that would be filed but for that
cost. PTO process costs thus create a screen against lower-value
patents. If a patentee believes her property right will be worth less
than $22,000 (or so), she will likely refrain from filing in the first
place.44 In the section that follows, we explain the significance of this
screen for commercial firms, patent filers, and the patent system as a
whole.

42

See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
In addition to the sources cited in notes 40-41, supra, see, e.g., Rochell
Dreyfus, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1559, 1577 (2006) (arguing that the Patent Office should endeavor to exclude as few
patents as possible based on cost).
44
It is possible, of course, that patentees will not have good information
regarding the potential value of their property rights, and that they will file for
substantial numbers of patents that are worth less than $22,000 or refrain from filing
for substantial numbers of patents that are worth more than $22,000. Yet we believe
this is unlikely. The vast majority of patentees in the modern era are major firms
doing business in their inventive field. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley,
Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2099, 2117 (finding that 85% of all patents are assigned to corporations
upon issuance and noting that the average patent lists more than two inventors). For
these types of actors, estimations of commercial value typically precede research and
development decisions: firms will only undertake a line of research if they believe
(to some degree of certainty) that it will be commercially viable. Their knowledge
of the marketplace—necessary to the existence of the business in the first instance—
allows them to gauge the potential worth of their property rights.
43
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Low Barriers and Private/Public Asymmetries

By itself, the fact that patent application processes function as
a costly screen says little about what sorts of patents will be screened
out. It also provides little information regarding whether the screen is
desirable or undesirable. After all, if the costly screen is not
eliminating harmful patents, it serves only to increase transaction costs
for patent filers. Yet there is good reason to believe that PTO process
costs will disproportionately screen out harmful patents and thus
produce meaningful benefits.
Our objective in this section is to describe and analyze the
types of patents that will or will not be affected by the PTO’s costly
screen. In order to do so, we subdivide the universe of possible
patents into four categories by making two conceptual “cuts.” The
first step is to determine exactly which sorts of patents the costly
screen will select against. Accordingly, we divide the universe of
patents into “low” and “high” value types. We define these categories
based on the cost of obtaining a patent: those patents that are worth
more than $22,000 are, by definition, “high value” patents, and those
that are worth less than $22,000 are “low value” patents.45 It is
important to note that “low” does not necessarily mean “greater than
or equal to zero.” Under certain circumstances, a patent can have
negative value.46
The next step is to determine whether the patents affected by
the costly screen are “good” or “bad” patents—that is, whether they
are beneficial or harmful to innovation and to society more generally.
In order to do this, we draw a conceptual distinction between the
private value of a patented invention and the public or social value of
45

We do not mean to overstate the accuracy of these types of determinations.
For purposes of the analysis that follows we describe the operation of the costly
screen in terms of orders of magnitude: the screen will deter applicants who believe
their patents to be worth on the order of $22,000 (i.e., in the tens of thousands of
dollars) or less and will not dissuade applicants who believe they have inventions
that are an order of magnitude more valuable (i.e., worth in the hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more). Even this crude distinction permits us to draw
definitive conclusions about the function and consequences of the PTO’s costly
screen.
46
We also note that it is not entirely accurate to speak of “low value patents;”
the entire point of this conceptual division is that the costly screen will deter
applicants from filing for patents that are worth that little. They are more accurately
described as “potential” low-value patents, but we will refer to them as “low-value
patents” in the interest of simplicity.
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that invention. The private value of a patent is what it is worth to the
patent holder; the social value is what it is worth to society at large.47
Social and private values can be low or high, per the previous
distinction.
Using these two distinctions, the universe of patents can be
separated into four categories. First, there are patents with both high
private value and high social value. These are valuable, novel
inventions—new drug compounds, innovative computer circuits,
etc.—that contribute something tangible to society and might not exist
but for the research incentives created by the patent system. They
represent the paradigm case for the patent system. Second, there are
patents with high private value and low or negative social value.
These are minor or insignificant innovations that contribute little to
public knowledge but are nonetheless drafted in such a way can be
used to collect significant licensing fees or litigation awards from
profitable companies.48 Third, there are patents of low private value
and low or negative social value. These are quite common and come
in a variety of shapes and forms; we discuss them in greater detail
below. And fourth, one could imagine patents of low private value
and high social value. Table 1 illustrates these four potential types of
patents graphically.

47

Two minor points of clarification. First, to be precise, it is the patent itself
(the intellectual property right) that creates private value by allowing the inventor to
capture returns from the invention, while it is the underlying invention that creates
social value. Nonetheless, in the interest of simplicity we will simply refer to
low/high private/social value patents. Second, we will describe the social value of a
patent (its effect on social welfare) directly, not as a sum of some private benefit and
some social cost. We do this for two reasons. First, the private benefit from patent
rights typically involves only wealth transfers, which have no effect on social
welfare. And second, it is easier to understand and evaluate these quantities
separately, as there is direct information on them. These moves have no theoretical
consequences; we highlight them only for reasons of clarity.
48
See, e.g., Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining
Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994).
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Table 1: Four Possible Patent Types
1. High private value/
High social value

2. High private value/
Low social value

4. Low private value/
High social value

3. Low private value/
Low social value

In the sections that follow, we describe these four categories of
patents in greater detail and explain their significance in relation to the
PTO’s costly screen. Our theory is that patents are not evenly
distributed among these four categories.
Instead, there is a
pronounced asymmetry within the universe of potential patents, one
that causes the costly to block primarily harmful, low social value
patents. Where the PTO’s actual, substantive examination fails, the
agency’s costly screen may succeed.
1.

High Private Value/High Social Value Patents

When one thinks of a paradigmatic patent, one typically
images a patent that is valuable both to its owners (high private value)
and to the public at large (high social value).49 These types of patents
come in many forms and occupy many technological fields—they
might cover useful new drug compounds, innovative semiconductor
devices, or the like. But they share three common characteristics.
First, they must be at least plausibly valid,50 and thus plausibly
enforceable as property rights; and second, they must claim inventions

49

It is not quite accurate to speak of a “high social value patent,” because the
privately held property right is itself unlikely to be worth anything to the public.
Rather, it is the underlying invention that is socially valuable. We use “high social
value patents” here purely as shorthand for that idea. On the other hand, it is the
property right that exacts social costs.
50
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2007).
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(or important components or subparts of inventions51) that are
commercially viable and useful in a market economy. A patent that
satisfies those two conditions is privately valuable—its owner will be
able to extract rents either through licensing or through production of
the patented good. If the patent is to have social value—if the
invention behind it is to be social welfare-enhancing—a third
condition must be satisfied: the patent must describe inventions that
are genuinely new and thus contribute some socially valuable
knowledge that did not previously exist.
The patent system is designed to promote precisely this type of
high private value/high social value patent. And while the PTO’s
costly screen will make these patents slightly more costly to obtain, it
will likely block few or none of them. Twenty-two thousand dollars is
a meaningful amount of money, but it represents little more than
rounding error in comparison to a truly valuable intellectual property
right. The $22,000 cost of obtaining a patent is unlikely to discourage
researchers who believe that their work will lead to useful, marketable
inventions.52 Thus, while the costs of getting a patent are real, they
will not deter any valuable innovations that fall into this category.
There will be no large losses to society because inventions are not
being created.
2.

High Private Value/Low Social Value Patents

Although an ideal patent system would not allow patents that
generate revenue for their holders without correspondingly benefitting
51

For instance, a patent on a braking system for roller coasters is valuable even
without a matching patent on the roller coaster itself. See United States Patent No.
6,062,350.
52
We hasten to add that under certain circumstances it is possible that small (or
solo) inventors might be subject to capital constraints that would inhibit their ability
to obtain a patent or commercialize an invention. Even a valuable idea could be lost
if its holder does not possess the necessary $22,000 in start-up capital. Nevertheless,
it will be the rare inventor who cannot obtain the financing necessary to prosecute a
patent valued in the millions, or (in the alternative) find a willing buyer for the same
idea. $22,000 is a fairly small amount of money, even for a solo investor. See
RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE
CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL MARKETS TO CREATE
WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (2003) 17-29 (arguing, using empirical data,
that existing financial markets provide entrepreneurs with plentiful options for
raising capital). It is worth noting that $22,000 is far less than the typical mortgage,
and less even than many unsecured personal loans.
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society, the current patent system is far from ideal. A patent may have
contributed little or no useful knowledge, but it might nevertheless
cover profitable inventions created by others and thus be valuable to
its owner.53 Patents may be privately valuable because they can be
deployed offensively, with the intention of collecting awards for
infringement or licensing fees;54 they may hold value as defensive
mechanisms for protecting commercial products from competition or
from suit for infringement;55 and they might be usefully employed as
signals to dissuade potential market entrants or attract investors and
other third parties.56 As a class, these patents have high private value:
they satisfy the first two conditions listed above—plausible validity
and commercial relevance.
At the same time, a patent might hold only small or negative
social value because it involves little or no socially useful innovation.
They do not provide the substantial benefits conveyed by the
genuinely useful and novel inventions described above. These are the
types of patents typically wielded by “patent trolls”—those businesses
that contribute no new useful innovative activity but possess a
portfolio of patents that they enforce against others.57
Like the high private value/high social value patents described
above, the PTO’s costly screen will not serve as a meaningful barrier
to high private value/low social value patents. The twenty-two
thousand dollar barrier to entry is a small fraction of the value to be
realized from a patent of this type. Accordingly, the cost of obtaining
a patent is almost beside the point for inventions such as these. Patent
applicants will file for them despite the cost.
53

See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 21-24 (2008)
(describing the power of invalid patents in collecting rents and interfering with
commercialization).
54
See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.
J. 1521, 1522-24 (2005). On licensing, see Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky,
The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (2003).
55
See John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment of Oligopolies with Mutually
Blocking Patent Portfolios, 69 ANTITRUST 851 (2002); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in I
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 121 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
56
See, e.g., Clarissa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 651-53
(2002); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 144 (2000).
57
See generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble With Trolls: Innovation, RentSeeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1583 (2009) (describing
and analyzing the behavior of patent trolls).
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Low Private Value/Low Social Value Patents

We now turn to the first class of patents that the PTO’s costly
screen will select against: those patents that would have both low
private value (to their owners) and low social value. Here, because the
private value of any individual patent is less than the cost required to
obtain it, patent applicants will frequently elect not to file for these
types of patents. In that sense it is appropriate to think of this category
as containing “potential” patents—patents that would exist in large
numbers but for the costly screen. That is not to say that there will be
no such patents—applicants will sometimes err in valuing their own
inventions, or they will take gambles, or they will patent for any
number of reasons not involving the prospect of financial gain.58 But
the number of these patents will be much lower than it would be
absent the PTO’s costly screen.
What sorts of patents (and potential patents) fall into the low
private value/low social value category? These patents come in a
variety of forms, but two important flavors predominate. The first are
those patents that comprise the “patent thicket”: essentially worthless
patents that are rarely litigated or enforced. The fact that these patents
are rarely used actively does not mean that they have no economic
significance, however. On the contrary: they drive up search costs and
increase litigation risk for commercial firms that are actually
innovating and manufacturing.59 The very existence of these patents is
enough to raise costs for productive firms, regardless of what the
patents’ owners do with them.60
These types of patents raise costs to productive firms in a
variety of ways. First, any firm that wishes to enter a market must
investigate the intellectual property that exists in that area of
58

Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. ___, at 15-18 (forthcoming 2012, unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(cataloguing the reasons why authors and inventors might produce innovations in the
absence of financial motivations).
59
See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid
Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 132–37 (2006); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 872-74 (2007); ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 615-16 (2007).
60
Leslie, supra note 59, at 137 (analyzing the harm that even unenforced patents
can do to competitors and consumers within the marketplace).
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technology and determine (at least preliminarily) whether those
patents are valid.61 This investigation, even if cursory, can be quite
expensive. The search costs of combing through a technological field
littered with patents can be prohibitively high for small firms. Second,
invalid patents can hamper a firm’s ability to raise capital62 or write
contracts with potential customers.63 Financial markets will be wary
of firms that may be targets for lawsuits because they produce
infringing products. Customers will hesitate before forming business
relationships that may expose them to suits for contributory
infringement and resist relying upon suppliers who may be shut down
or driven out of the market by a lawsuit.64 Again, these costs will exist
even if no lawsuits are ever filed. It is the very fact that firms must
search through the thicket of potentially dangerous patents, and the
uncertainty that this creates, that drives up business costs.
The invalid patents that create these costs have very low value
to their owners—they are valuable only to the extent that their owners
wish to keep competitors out of the marketplace. Accordingly, they
diminish social welfare by retarding competition without any
meaningful inventive quid pro quo.
The second major flavor of low private value/low social value
patents—and one that has been comparatively overlooked—are
patents that are useful primarily in nuisance lawsuits. Any patent
infringement suit (or threat of suit) involving even a vaguely plausibly
valid and infringed patent has a nuisance settlement value of
approximately $10,000. The reason is that any patent defendant who
is sued must pay for an opinion letter informing the potential infringer
of the strength of the patent-holder’s case65 and guarding against later
61

See id. at 132–37; Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 59, at 16–17; KnorrBremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344–47
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
62
See Fed. Trade Comm’n, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE
OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch. 2, at 8 (2003) (“The threat of
being sued for infringement by an incumbent [patent holder]—even on a meritless
claim—may ‘scare . . . away’ venture capital financing.”) (quoting testimony of
Professor
Joshua
Lerner,
Opening
Statement,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/lernerjosh.pdf).
63
Leslie, supra note 25, at 125–27.
64
See Joseph Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit—Ordeal by Trial, 17 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 634, 641 (1950) (“Contributory infringement . . . can serve as an effective
side-attack to cut off the economic support of a small producer.”).
65
This is standard practice within the field. See Lemley, Rational Ignorance,
supra note 39, at 1513.
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claims of willful infringement66—and the cost of such a letter is
approximately $10,000.67 Substantial numbers of these actions are
initiated by solo inventors or patent holding companies with no
commercial ventures beyond the exploitation of its intellectual
property portfolio.
Costs will rise for productive firms if they are forced to pay
small licensing fees or settlements to a series of patent-holders who
file nuisance lawsuits.68 Firms that face the prospect of being nickeland-dimed by the owners of dubious patents may well choose to
refrain from investing in new technologies or entering new markets in
the first place.69 In addition, the nuisance lawsuits themselves can
66

The patent statute allows courts to assess treble damage penalties against
willful infringers. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2008) (“[T]he court may increase the damages
up to three times the amount found or assessed.”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497
F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (setting forth the modern standard for determining
when infringement has been willful); see, e.g., Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod.
Tools, Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (opinion letter provides nearimpenetrable defense to charges of willful infringement); Nickson Indus. v. Rol Mfg.
Co., 847 F.2d 795, 800 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (same). An accused infringer has no
affirmative duty to seek an opinion letter if it wishes to avoid liability for willful
infringement, Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371, but the chances of a finding of willful
infringement increase dramatically when an infringer has not obtained an opinion
letter, and so nearly any colorable accusation will trigger a request for the opinion of
counsel.
67
These estimates are based upon conversations with attorneys at a number of
law firms, principally Kirkland & Ellis LLP and Schiff Harden LLP. Notes on file
with author. The cost of such a letter can be much higher—in the range of
$30,000—if the technology involved is complex or the asserted patents sufficiently
numerous.
68
Leslie, supra note 33, at 133 (describing the economics of patent nuisance
lawsuits).
69
See Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anticompetitive
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 509, 515 (2003) (analyzing the
prospective effects that threats of nuisance lawsuits can have on firm behavior); see
also Bresnick v. U.S. Vitamin Corp., 139 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J.)
(describing a patent as a “scarecrow” that can deter competition by its very
existence); But see Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 265
(Posner, J.) (“[A] patent known to the trade to be invalid will not discourage
competitors from making the patented product or using the patented process, and so
will not confer monopoly power . . . .”). Judge Posner may be correct that a patent
must be of at least “colorable” validity in order for it to be used as a means of
exerting monopoly power, but see supra note 25, at 133, but his analysis does not
speak to the possibility that the asymmetric transaction costs involved in patent
litigation will enable the holder of a plainly invalid patent to extract small payouts
from market entrants.
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produce significant deadweight losses; litigants spend thousands of
dollars in transaction costs to prosecute and settle nuisance lawsuits
worth $20,000 or less. Accordingly, substantial quantities of even
plainly invalid patents can impose significant social costs through
sheer force of numbers.
The patents that comprise the “thicket” and those that give rise
to nuisance lawsuits represent intellectual property at its very worst.
They do little more than drive up transaction costs for firms that
genuinely want to innovate and bring products to markets.
Happily, then, the PTO’s costly screen will block these sorts of patents
in substantial numbers. The upfront costs of obtaining a patent deter
potential filers from seeking many of these useless patents that would
otherwise wind up in the thicket. And because it costs more to acquire
a patent than can be extracted in one or two nuisance settlements,
patents become substantially less attractive as business tools and less
open to exploitation.70
Moreover, the costly screen is even costlier, and thus more
effective, against these types of patents. There are two reasons for
this. First, many of the more insidious patents described here hold
only low private value because they are not plausibly valid.71 All else
being equal, it is more expensive to force a questionable patent
through the PTO than a clearly valid one. Patents of suspect validity
are more likely to be rejected initially by the patent examiner, forcing
the applicant to pay additional attorneys’ fees and administrative
expenses in order to resubmit the application.72 Second, the patent
70

See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PENN. L. REV. 519
(1997) (analyzing the nuisance lawsuit as a business tactic). This is not to say that
nuisance lawsuits will never be profitable, or that firms will never pursue
questionable patents with the intent only to extract such settlements. A firm may be
able to garner more than one quick payout with each patent, though at the same time
it will not necessarily be capable of coercing targets—especially repeat players—
into paying even inexpensive blackmail. Because of the costs of obtaining a patent,
a firm cannot count on being able to turn a profit, or even recoup its investment, by
threatening some number of small, meritless suits; it must actually believe that it has
an invention worth commercializing or a valid patent in a commercially useful field
before a patent application becomes worth the cost of prosecution.
71
Some patents will hold small private value because they are commercially
insignificant—a patent on a method for swinging on a swing, for instance—but these
patents are typically irrelevant from an economic or social perspective as well. See
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 23, at 32 (2004) (describing a variety of commercially
irrelevant inventions that have nonetheless led to patents).
72
See supra Part II.A.
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thicket is most harmful in heavily congested technical fields, where
large numbers of related patents drive up search costs.73 But the more
patents that exist within a given field, the more likely that a patent
examiner considering a new application will find prior art casting
doubt on whether the invention is novel (and thus patentable).74 In
addition, repeated continuations and re-filings—which become
necessary if a patent is initially rejected—will delay a patent’s
issuance, eating into the twenty-year patent term that begins to run on
the day a patent application is filed.75 Consequently, transaction costs
of all types will be higher for inventors who attempt to push through
questionable patents, or who attempt to patent inventions in heavily
commercialized fields in which those patents might do the most
harm.76
In effect, then, the very administrative processes that allow
patentees to “wear down” examiners simultaneously increase the
barriers against the least desirable patents. If the patent system is
crudely successful at screening for invalid or damaging patents, it is
not only (or primarily) because examiners are actually denying those
patents. Rather, the process costs involved in applying for a patent
may be playing just as large a role.
Again, of course, the Patent Office’s costly screen will hardly
bar all of these low private value, low social value patents; tens of
thousands of such applications are filed yearly (and many of them
granted eventually).77 Yet without a costly screen—if, for instance,

73

See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property
in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998) (analyzing the
negative effects of crowded property rights on economic development); Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698 (1998) (applying the same idea to innovation).
74
See 35 U.S.C. § 102. Examiners have better access to patents than they do to
prior art in any other form. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 16, at 145–49 (describing
the process of patent examination).
75
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2008).
76
The semiconductor and computer fields are typically understood to be heavily
patented, while the pharmaceutical industry is generally thought to involve fewer
overlapping property rights. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 16; Mark A. Lemley, Ten
Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not To), 48 B.C. L. Rev.
149 (2007).
77
See Lemley, Rational Ignorance, supra note 39 at 1528 (providing statistics
on the rates of patent grants).
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the PTO were to move to a registration system78—the problem would
likely be far worse. By selecting against this class of patents, the
costly screen performs a beneficial function. Indeed, the costly screen
may be more effective at eliminating harmful low private value/low
social value patents than the substantive examination that the process
costs are themselves used to purchase.
4.

Low Private Value/High Social Value Patents

The previous section detailed the benefits that the PTO’s costly
screen provides by weeding out low private value/low social value
patents. However, these benefits would be quickly outweighed if the
costly screen were similarly deterring inventors from creating (and
filing for) low private value/high social value inventions. That is,
imagine that an inventor has the opportunity to create an invention of
high social value but would only have the incentive to do if she could
obtain a patent on that invention. Imagine further that the patent
would hold only low private value. If the costly screen dissuaded
inventors from obtaining patents on these inventions, and if the
inability to obtain patents dissuaded inventors from innovating in the
first place, the loss to society might be significant.
But there is a crucial asymmetry within the universe of
potential patents: low private value/high social value patents
essentially do not exist. With very few exceptions, any truly novel,
commercially relevant invention—i.e., any socially productive
invention—will give rise to a privately valuable patent on that
invention.79 This is precisely the point of the patent system: patents
allow inventors to capture a substantial portion of the wealth created
by their inventions.
Importantly, then, the PTO’s costly screen will not stand in the
way of any high social value inventions. Any such invention would
also hold high private value for its owner, and thus be worth inventing
(and patenting) despite the screen. It is in this sense that the
asymmetry in patent law, driven by the strength of the patent right,
78

E.g. Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 953 (2007); F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003).
79
See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 16-17 (2009) (describing the usefulness of patents as legal
tools for capturing value from innovation).
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makes the PTO’s examination-based costly screen valuable. The
screen does not deter genuine innovation, but it does block large
numbers of low private value/low social value patents that create
social costs for productive and innovative firms.
Now, to say that the category of low private value/high social
value patents is empty is to invite counterexamples. But even
inventions that might appear at first glance to fall into this category are
not truly low private value/high social value in the sense meant here.
Or, put another way, the PTO’s costly screen will have no effect on
whether they will or will not be developed. Consider, for instance,
“orphan” drugs—pharmaceutical inventions for which patent
protection has expired (or nearly so).80 Orphan drugs are low private
value/high social value inventions in the most literal sense: these drugs
would be valuable to society if manufactured and distributed, but no
firm can make a great enough profit from them to render their
development commercially worthwhile.81 As a result, they languish.
Yet this has nothing to do with the cost of obtaining a patent on the
drugs. These drugs are unprofitable because the costs of obtaining
FDA approval are so high—in the tens or hundreds of millions of
dollars. In addition, once the FDA has approved the drug, any
company can manufacture and sell it.82 Other firms can then free ride
off of the first FDA approval without incurring the same costs and
compete away the first firm’s profits.83 This is what turns drugs into
“orphans;” the $22,000 cost of obtaining a patent is simply irrelevant
to the calculation.
Or consider the large number of valuable patents that are given
over to the public for one reason or another. This category includes
patents on standardized interfaces;84 patents that are deliberately
pooled and made publicly available;85 and patents that have been
80

See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 386-87
(2010) (discussing orphaned drugs).
81
See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 Texas L. Rev. 503, 551-55 (2009) (discussing the financial
incentives that lead to the problem of orphan drugs).
82
Id. at 522.
83
Id.
84
See generally Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding
Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1943 (2009) (describing the problems that can
arise when these patents are not transferred to the public domain).
85
See generally Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of
Current Law and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (2007).
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obtained in the course of a government contract and must be licensed
at zero cost to the government.86 At first glance, these patents might
appear to have high social value but low private value. After all, their
owners are bestowing them freely upon the public. But this
appearance is misleading. These types of property rights most
certainly do have high private value; it just happens that the particular
owners who have come into possession of them have chosen to
relinquish them, rather than exploit them. This is often because the
private owner stands to reap greater benefits from renouncing the
patent than from attempting to enforce it.87 If the patent were owned
by another firm with a different business model, the outcome would
undoubtedly be very different.88 Moreover, as we explained above,
the creation of the intellectual property right is quite beside the
point—it is the underlying technology that matters to society.
Inventors are obviously undertaking this research and development
even though they plan to transfer the intellectual property rights to the
public.89 The PTO’s costly screen thus poses no threat to this type of
innovation.
Finally, it is possible that patents function as lottery tickets: an
inventor might file for large numbers of patents, hoping (but not
knowing) whether one will become valuable. Ex ante, each individual
patent might therefore be worth little to the inventor.90 The costly
screen could deter the filing of some of these lottery tickets.
86

See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal. Rptr. 828, 834 (1986) (“[T] the
government requires defense contractors to give it title or a license in any patents
conceived or reduced to practice during the course of performance of government
contracts.”). We thank Pam Samuelson for drawing this category of patents to our
attention.
87
In the case of the government contractor, for instance, the contractor would
undoubtedly prefer to retain the patent right. However, the government contract is
more valuable than the property right—and that government contract is undoubtedly
worth more than $22,000.
88
We return to this point about non-pecuniary motivations in Part III.C.1, infra.
89
Among other things, it is not necessary to obtain a patent in order to ensure
that a technology remains in the public domain. Proof of first inventorship or
dissemination of the technology to the public will do the trick. See 35 U.S.C. §
102(b), (g).
90
The idea is related, though not identical, to “patent portfolio theory,”
developed by Gideon Parchomovsky and Polk Wagner, which embodies the idea that
in many industries patents are more valuable in groups than they are singly. See
Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2005). Patent portfolio theory is entirely consistent with the ideas we propound
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Even at first glance, this theory does not seem to do justice to
inventors and patent holders, at least on the valuation scales relevant
here. As we noted earlier, the vast majority of patentees in the modern
era are major firms doing business in their inventive field.91 Their
knowledge of the marketplace will likely allow them to make
judgments far more accurate than the idea of “lottery tickets” would
suggest. And again, these valuations need not even be terribly finegrained; the question is whether the patent is worth only tens of
thousands of dollars or substantially more.
But even if the notion of patents as lottery tickets is an accurate
representation of reality, it is not clear that the patent system should
accommodate it. Massive quantities of low-value patents impose
significant negative externalities upon other firms seeking to do
business in the same markets.92 The PTO’s costly screen would force
inventors to invest additional resources in acquiring information about
the expected value of their inventions. This would cause them to be
more circumspect in selecting which patents to file—precisely the
outcome that would be most beneficial to society.93
The preceding examples should provide some indication as to
what it means for a patent to have low private value and high social
value, and why such patents essentially do not exist. In the end, of
course, there could be minor exceptions to the rule. Inventions may
fall through the cracks, or their value may not become apparent when
they are created. One could imagine a transformative idea that does
not directly give rise to an “invention,”94 or a peculiar invention that
here. If a multitude of patents collectively hold some significant value, each
individual patent may be worth a comparably modest amount.
91
See Allison & Lemley, supra note 44, at 2117.
92
See supra notes 59-78 and accompanying text (describing costs related to the
low private value/low social value patents).
93
This will prove impossible only when patent filing patent must necessarily
precede systematic investigation of the invention’s commercial worth, most notably
(and perhaps only) as with patents on new pharmaceutical compounds, which are
filed before FDA trials on those drugs begin. See generally Roin, supra note 81, at
523-28. There, whatever effect the PTO’s costly screen may be having, it is far from
debilitating; the pharmaceutical industry is “often described as the patent system’s
greatest success story.” Id. at 510; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of
New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 717, 720–21 (2005) (“Patent law
traditionally takes the lion's share of credit for motivating investments in drug
development.”).
94
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2008) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . .”).

COSTLY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

30

creates wealth that somehow cannot be captured commercially. But
these patents will be the rare outliers. Unlike the other three
categories of patents, there is no true class of high social/low private
patents. The asymmetry may not be absolute, but it is undoubtedly
significant. And the theory here does not depend on this category of
patents being entirely nonexistent; as long as there is a meaningful
asymmetry, the PTO’s costly screen will disproportionately select
against patents that are socially harmful.
Table 2 summarizes this set of relationships between private
and social value for various types of patents. Only patents of low
private value and low or negative social value—precisely those patents
most likely to diminish social welfare—will be meaningfully affected
by the cost of PTO procedures. Accordingly, the costly screen
established by patent procedures will act only against low social value
patents—precisely the type of intellectual property right the patent
system should be weeding out.
Table 2: Social and Private Values of Various Patent Classes
High social value
High
private
value

Commercial
products;
improvements;
major components

Low
private
value

Essentially none

Low or negative
social value
Blocking patents;
valid
patents
involving little novel
research

Nuisance patents;
minor inventions

It remains impossible to know for certain whether the process
costs involved with patent examination are justified in the aggregate.
After all, every applicant—including those with valid patents and
useful inventions—is forced to expend significant resources to obtain
a patent. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that the costly
screen imposed by PTO examination, coupled with the substantive
examination purchased by those costs, serves as a productive filter
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against welfare-diminishing patents without deterring any truly
socially productive inventions.
III.

COSTLY COPYRIGHTS

Copyrights, like patents, vest in both highly lucrative and
popular works as well as trivial and worthless ones, albeit for very
different reasons. In contrast to patents, law allows copyrights to arise
with relative ease. Instead of navigating an extensive examination
process, authors need only fix their work in a tangible medium in
order for federal copyright to vest. The costlessness with which
copyrights arise has led to an unchecked increase in copyrighted works
of authorship, accompanied by a critical scholarship arguing that this
increase is socially harmful and that it should be cabined by the
imposition of various screening devices. Analyzing copyrights
through the lens of costly screens illustrates why such suggestions may
diminish, rather than enhance, social welfare. Because copyrights
array differently across classes of value than patents, however,
imposition of costly screens would preclude the production of a crucial
category of works (low private value, high social value) while
eliminating a class of works that is largely innocuous (low private
value, low social value) and would be detrimental to social welfare.
A.

Copyright Costs

The vesting of federal copyrights costs authors almost
nothing.95 Once an author fixes an original work of authorship in a
tangible medium of expression, they own the copyright in that work
without further ado.96 Acquiring a copyright is not entirely costless.
Vesting requires fixation in a tangible medium of expression, but this
is usually effectively costless since fixation occurs coterminously with
creation, as where an author types a novel on a laptop computer or
95

The copyright system is not entirely costless. Vesting requires fixation in a
tangible medium of expression, but this is usually effectively costless since fixation
occurs coterminously with creation, as where an author types a novel on a laptop
computer or paints a portrait on canvas. There are some instances where creation
may take place in the absence of fixation—such as where the authors of sound
recordings must record their works to perfect their rights—so that in these cases,
fixation will add some cost prior to vesting. Still, the costs of fixing a work are, on
average, so low that we can treat them as negligible for the purpose of our analysis.
96
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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paints a portrait on canvas. There are some instances where creation
may take place in the absence of fixation—such as where the authors
of sound recordings must record their works to perfect their rights—so
that in these cases, fixation will add some cost prior to vesting. Still,
the costs of fixing a work are, on average, so low that we can treat
them as negligible for the purpose of our analysis.97
The essential screenlessness of the federal copyright system
has caused copyrights to become ever more numerous, and many
authors have expressed reservations about this trend. A primary
concern resides in the uncertainty created by the numerosity of
copyrights. Some have argued that, in a world where any minimally
original and fixed work is likely the subject of copyright protection,
the odds that future work will infringe some preexisting right
multiplies, deterring risk-averse authors from creation.98 In a related
vein, others have suggested that copyright’s low vesting threshold
leads to prohibitively high transaction costs because owners are so
numerous that even if their rights are ascertainable, creators may be
unable (for pecuniary or practical reasons) to acquire the licenses
necessary to clear the rights associated with making future work.99

97

Formalities exist in other areas of copyright law. For example, in order to
bring a copyright infringement suit in federal court, an owner’s work must be
registered with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 411. Registration also secures
other advantages for prevailing parties, including the option of recovering statutory
damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs. Id. § 412. Because registration is not
related to the initial vesting of a copyright, and indeed can only occur once vesting
has taken place, it is not a formality that is relevant to our analysis.
98
See, e.g., LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE (2004) (discussing this information
costs concern about the expansion of copyright); Jim Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 882 (2007)
(“Intellectual property's road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because liability
is difficult to predict and the consequences of infringement are dire, risk-averse
intellectual property users often seek a license when none is needed.”).
99
See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 8 (discussing this transaction costs
concern about the expansion of copyright); Jim Gibson, Once and Future Copyright,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2005) (arguing that the low copyright vesting
threshold threatens to restrict creativity, particularly in digital settings); see also,
e.g., Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Untold Stories: Creative Consequences of
the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers 7-22 (2004), available at
http://
www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf
(enumerating examples of documentary films that have had difficulty being made
due to rights-clearance concerns).
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One response to this concern has been to raise the process costs
associated with copyright in order to limit them.100 One such proposal
suggests the reintroduction of formalities that were formerly
prerequisites for copyright vesting. Prior to the effective date of the
1976 Act, registration with proper notice was necessary for U.S.
copyrights to arise.101 When the Act became effective, the “fixation in
a tangible medium of expression” standard supplanted the preexisting
requirements for perfecting copyrights, resulting in a much lower
vesting threshold. In recent years, writers have floated various
proposals for increasing vesting costs as a way of liming copyrights.
Jim Gibson, for example, has called for a straightforward return to a
pre-1976 Act formalities regime, arguing for the reintroduction of
notice and publication as copyright vesting prerequisites in order to cut
down on the accretion of owners’ rights. 102 A different but related
proposal suggested by Larry Lessig, the Public Domain Enhancement
Act, would require owners to pay $1 to renew their copyrights
following the fiftieth year of protection.103 Chris Sprigman has also
suggested a scheme by which compliance with a registration system
would be prerequisite to the stronger, property-rule protections of the
Copyright Act.104 Though very different, these proposals illustrate the

100

For a good overview of the U.S. experience with formalities, see Jane
Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311 (2010).
101
17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909 Act).
102
E.g., Gibson, supra note 99, at 221-31 (encouraging the reintroduction of
traditional formalities to limit the expansion of copyright); see also Ginsburg, supra
note 100 (advancing a qualified defense of formalities in copyright); Stef van
Gompel, Formalities in the Digital Era: An Obstacle or Opportunity? (proceedings
of the ALAI Annual Congress, London, England, June 14-17, 2009), available at
http://www.alai2009.org/Presentations/Van%20Gompel%20Formalities%20in%20th
e%20digital%20era.doc (arguing that reintroduction of formalities will facilitate
copyright clearance and enhance certainty about owners’ rights in digital media).
103
The Public Domain Enhancement Act was proposed in the House of
Representatives in both 2003 and 2005, but died in committee each time. See H.R.
2601 (2003); H.R. 2408 (2005). See also LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 248-56
(2004) (discussing early versions of the PDEA and the problems it faced gaining
traction in Congress).
104
Chris Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004)
(suggesting that registration should be a prerequisite for property-rule enforcement
of copyright infringement).
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push toward increasing process costs among writers concerned about
excess copyright.105
In this Part, we raise questions about this literature, at least
insofar as it suggests that raising the costs of initially acquiring a
copyright is an unalloyed good, using costly screen theory to
illuminate a typically overlooked reason that the proliferation of
copyrights may not be as socially harmful as is generally believed.
We argue that just as costly screen theory helps to explain the logic of
patent’s costly examination system, so can it help to explain why
copyright lacks any meaningful hurdles to the creation of authors’
exclusive rights. Because the Copyright Act confers on owners a
much weaker property entitlement than the Patent Act does, copyrights
array across classes of value differently than patents. This asymmetry
means that costly screens would be as counterproductive in the
copyright setting as they would be beneficial in the patent setting.
That copyrights arise without any process costs creates a
challenge for analyzing the current system in terms of costly screens.
With patents, our analytical approach was straightforward. We
established the costs of patent examination, and used that figure as the
line dividing high private value from low private value patents.
Thinking about copyright in terms of costly screens, by contrast,
requires a counterfactual thought experiment. We must imagine a cost
threshold for copyright vesting, and then examine the implication of
that threshold on the creation of works of authorship. For the sake of
symmetry and ease of exposition, we posit a world in which getting a
copyright is as difficult as getting a patent. In such a world, authors
would have to submit their work to an expensive and onerous
examination process, and exclusive rights would not vest until after
the Copyright Office approved authors’ applications. This possible
alternative would make copyright vesting just as costly as acquiring a
valid patent—about $22,000.106
105

Any such proposal may have implementation problems because the United
States’ international obligations under the Berne Convention limit its ability to make
copyright vesting contingent on formalities. Since we mention these proposals only
to give a sense of the contours of the present copyright literature, we need not
address these concerns.
106
This is by no means the only possible option. One can imagine a trademarklike system for vesting copyright that would involve some consideration of a
copyright’s validity and compliance with formalities, though far less than patent
examination entails. Such a system would charge authors the same amount that
trademark registrants currently bear, or roughly $1000. Or one can imagine a system
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Copyright Screens and Public/Private Asymmetries

Our next move is to imagine how such a screen would affect
the production of works of authorship. As with patents, we can
imagine two axes along which the value of copyright can be arrayed:
the private value generated for the owner, and the social value
generated for the public. Examples of the private value generated by
copyright abound. An author’s ability to earn royalties from book or
album sales, or a movie studio’s capacity to recover revenues from
ticket sales to a feature film are largely dependent on the owners
having exclusive rights in those works. Works of authorship are
typically nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, and in the absence of
legally enforceable exclusive rights, owners would have no recourse to
uncompensated consumption of them. It is thus copyright (the
exclusive legal entitlement, as distinguished from the protected work)
that enables authors to profit from their works,107 and in so doing
that keeps the current copyright registration regime, but makes it a prerequisite to
vesting rather than to judicial enforcement of infringement actions. This approach
would charge authors the current copyright registration fee, about $100, to vest their
rights.
While it may be interesting to examine the implications of these systems on
copyright vesting, we have opted to use the higher threshold in our thought
experiment because this paper is about costly screens, and the implications of much
lower-cost alternatives are simply outside its scope.
107
Copyright is not the exclusive means by which authors earn profits from their
work. Contract may furnish a plausible alternative to copyright in some instances.
E.g., William Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1203, 1250 (discussing the potential of contract to supplement, and in some
cases supplant, copyright as a means for enabling authors to extract value from their
works). But as the Supreme Court has emphasized, copyright remains the dominant
means by which authors extract value from their creations. See Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (observing that “the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing
a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas”).
Related, copyright is not always necessary for the production of creative works.
Some authors may create because they are driven by some other force—desire for
literary fame, or simply artistic inspiration—that is unrelated to profit. Moreover,
some works—such as computer programs—may be difficult enough to copy that
authors can reap sufficient rewards in the gap between first creation and first copy to
provide a sufficient incentive to create. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K.
Levine, Perfectly Competitive Innovation, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
Research Department Report 303 (March 2002). Our thesis thus operates only with
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generates private value for those authors. The distinction between the
author’s copyright in the work and the work itself is important.
Customers buy books or .mp3s, and audiences queue up for movies,
because they want to see the work itself, regardless of whether it is
copyrighted.108 It is thus the work that directly generates social value,
but the copyright in that work that generates private value.
Social value is harder to quantify in terms of dollars, but as in
our patent discussion we define it simply as the net effect (positive or
negative) that copyright has on aggregate welfare. As with private
value, examples of the social benefits generated by creative work are
familiar. Works of authorship generate aesthetic value, as where a
landscape painting causes viewers to experience the beauty of the
scene portrayed by the artist. They may also create informational
value, as where a cookbook educates users and enables them to make
new dishes by following specific instructions. A creative work may
also enrich viewers more generally, as where a groundbreaking
fictional novel causes readers to think about the world around them, or
the craft of writing, in a new way. These forms of social value derive
directly from works of authorship themselves, and do not require the
existence of copyright. Nevertheless, copyright indirectly creates
social value by incentivizing the creation of socially valuable works, at
least to the extent that such works may not be created but for the
protections afforded owners by exclusive rights.109
Before we consider the impact of costly screens on the
production of works of authorship, we pause to describe how
copyrights array across classes of value. As with patents, copyright
can produce high or low private value, as well as high or low social
value. Our hypothetical copyright-vesting screen constructs the
high/low private value barrier. Authors will likely create works that
will generate more than the cost of the screen ($22,000), but will not
respect to works that are produced primarily in response to financial incentives. But
because these incentives are the core driver of the copyright system, see Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. at 219 (observing that the “economic philosophy” of the Copyright
Clause is to “advance public welfare” by “encourag[ing] individual effort” through
“personal gain”), this limitation does not diminish the force of our argument.
108
That consumers are copyright-indifferent is obvious. Countless readers enjoy
Moby Dick and John Grisham books every year, even though the latter is
copyrighted, while the former is in the public domain.
109
For this reason, we refer throughout this section to “high (or low) social
value copyrights,” although the social value is directly generated by the protected
work and not by the property right that attaches to that work.
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create any works that generate less than that amount. The idea of
“low” social value includes possible instances where copyrights create
negative social value. The social and private value axes combine to
generate four categories. First are high private value, high social value
copyrights. These are copyrights that create significant revenue
streams for their owner while also contributing knowledge,
information, or entertainment to the public (e.g., popular films, bestselling novels). The second category describes copyrights with high
private value and low social value, though we believe that such
copyrights are vanishingly rare. Third, there are copyrights of low
private value and low social value. We consider at length this
category and the argument that costly screens are attractive because
they eliminate such copyrights. Finally, some copyrights generate
high social value even though they create low private value. We
discuss this quadrant in detail as well, discussing the social costs
associated with limiting it. Table 3 illustrates these four potential
types of copyrights graphically.
Table 3: Four Possible Copyright Types
1. High private value/
High social value

2. High private value/
Low social value

4. Low private value/
High social value

3. Low private value/
Low social value

In the following four subparts, we analyze each of these
categories of copyrights in more detail. We begin by describing in the
types of copyrights that populate each quadrant. We then consider
how imposing a costly, patent-like screen would affect the production
of copyrightable works in each category, and explain how this thought
experiment reveals that the current, screenless copyright vesting
system is deceptively socially beneficial.
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High private value/high social value copyrights

In the first quadrant lie copyrights that create high value for
both their owner and for the public. This is the ideal utilitarian bargain
suggested by copyright’s constitutional source of law:110 an author
creates a work, the public consumes that work, and the owner
leverages her exclusive rights to earn income from that consumption.
Copyright’s value equation is often more complicated than this
account lets on, but frequently matters do unfold in just this standard
way. To take just one example, George Lucas’ popular Star Wars
films generated enormous private value for their producer, but they
also enriched the public, either straightforwardly through the aesthetic
experience of seeing the film, or less directly by generating cultural
touchstones, shared catch-phrases, and timeless motifs. This is not to
say that the private and social value created by Star Wars have been
equivalent. Rather, the latter must be greater than the former. While
George Lucas gets a cut whenever a licensee sells a Star Wars product
or fans buy a Return of the Jedi DVD, much of the value of the
beloved sci-fi franchise comes in the form of positive externalities that
Lucas cannot internalize.111 Moreover, the benefit to an individual
from seeing the film must be greater than the cost of a ticket. These
additional benefits above and beyond what members of the public
must pay constitute social value.
Here, the case for copyright is most secure.112 As we have
explained above, in the absence of exclusive rights that allow owners
to internalize value from their works, creators of even very promising
works would likely not make them at all, depriving themselves—and
the world—of their value. Copyright is, in other words, a necessary
prerequisite for the production of high private value, high social value
110

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power … To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
111
Jon Stewart didn’t have to pay Lucas for making Stewart’s mockery of Dick
Cheney even more effective by using Darth Vader comparisons, and we don’t have
to pay Lucas for the humor value of invoking familiar catch-phrases in every day
conversation (e.g., “These aren’t the droids you’re looking for” or “Many Bothams
died to bring you this information”). See generally Mark Lemley & Brett
Frischmann, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007) (discussing how copyright
generates positive externalities).
112
Cf. generally Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 281 (1970) (expressing doubt that economic incentives actually do increase the
production of works of authorship).
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works. For this reason, the production of such works would be
unaffected by high process costs. $22,000 to secure exclusive rights in
the Star Wars franchise is laughably trivial compared to the millions
that Lucasfilms has garnered thanks to those rights. Charging this
much for a copyright would not deter an author who believed that her
film, book, or song had the potential for major commercial success.
2.

High private value/low social value copyrights

The second category encompasses copyrights that create
significant value for their owner, but have low value for the public.
There are numerous such patents, such as blocking patents that allow
owners to extract substantial value through holdups while creating no
correlative benefits for society. By contrast, this quadrant contains
no—or vanishingly few—copyrights. The very different way in which
copyright law enables owners to extract value from their works of
authorship makes it unlikely that a work of authorship that generates
little or no value for the public will lead to a copyright that proves
remunerative for its owner.
Two reasons illuminate why this quadrant of the value grid lies
largely empty. First, the Patent and Copyright Acts create property
rights of very different scopes. Patent rights are significantly broader
than the entitlements enjoyed by copyright owners. The Patent Act
extends to owners exclusive rights preventing anyone else from
practicing the patentee’s invention or its equivalents.113 It is thus very
difficult to engineer around a well-drafted patent, and patent holders
can accordingly reap extensive rewards from commercial products that
embody the ideas behind their inventions.114 Copyright owners, by
contrast, do not enjoy this kind of general prerogative to preclude
others from using their work, but rather only six narrowly contoured
statutory exclusive rights.115 The scope of copyrights is further

113

See 35 U.S.C. § 271; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (setting
the standard for the patent doctrine of equivalents).
114
See generally MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 27, at 781-923 (describing
patent infringement doctrines and explaining their breadth and strength).
115
17 U.S.C. 106 (enumerating six exclusive rights of copyright owners); see
Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT’MT L.J. 337, 338 (2001)
(“The copyright statute doesn’t give copyright owners the exclusive right to use their
works for limited times, or the exclusive right to exploit their works commercially
for limited times. Instead, it gives copyright owners the exclusive rights to
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cabined at the front end by the idea/expression dichotomy. A
copyright owner exercises rights over only the specific expression that
is embodied by the author’s work, not to the general ideas that animate
it.116 It is narrowed again at the back end by various statutory defenses
such as fair use,117 and section 110’s rabbit warren of rights
limitations,118 all of which add up to permit unauthorized use under
many circumstances. The exclusive rights extended by copyright
simply do not allow authors to internalize anything close to the full
social value that their work actually generates. As a result, a work that
creates little social value will have a copyright that almost certainly
generates little (or no) private value for its author.
The relative narrowness of copyright owners’ exclusive rights
points to a second, related reason that the field of high private value,
low social value copyrights remains unpopulated: copyrights are
much easier to engineer around than patents. First, consider the
idea/expression dichotomy, which limits the subject matter of
copyright owners’ exclusive rights. Imagine that someone wishes to
write his own novel about the misadventures of a misfit young
magician, hoping to capitalize on the popularity of the Harry Potter
franchise. Such an effort blatantly seeks to free-ride off of J.K.
Rowling’s creativity and success, but as long as the second book
doesn’t copy any of the specific protectable expression (e.g., particular
textual passages, sufficiently well-developed characters) in the Harry
Potter books, none of Rowling’s rights have been violated.119 Second,
reproduce, adapt, distribute to the public and publicly perform or display their works,
subject to a host of statutory exceptions.”).
116
17 U.S.C. 102(b) (excluding ideas from copyright protection). The Patent
Act, by contrast, allows patentees to prevent others from using the ideas that animate
their invention for the entire twenty-year exclusive rights period. See 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(2).
117
17 U.S.C. § 107.
118
E.g., id. § 110(5)(B) (permitting public performance of nondramatic musical
works by transmission or retransmission in commercial establishments meeting
certain size and technology requirements).
119
Rowling might well sue anyway, though, if her reaction to an unauthorized
Harry Potter lexicon is any indication. There, a federal court concluded that the
creation of an annotated guide to the Potter series was actionable because it took
actual expression from Rowling’s books. Warner Bros. Entertainment v. RDR
Books, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 534-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). And for what it’s worth,
Rowling herself is the defendant in a suit alleging that she copied her Harry Potter
character from an earlier book called “Willy the Wizard.” Ryan Kisiel, “J.K.
Rowling Sued for £500 million,” MAIL ONLINE, June 16, 2009, available at
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copyright’s originality requirement creates a safe harbor for authors
who inadvertently create infringing works.120 The independent
creation defense allows creators of works identical to preexisting ones
a full defense if the second author can show that they created their
work without actually copying the first one.121 By contrast, patent’s
infringement doctrine allows patentees to enjoin all works that practice
the invention—even if the purported infringement in no way derived
from or was influenced by the original.122
Some critics have suggested that the category of high private
value, low social value copyrights is more populous than we claim.
One version of this argument invokes the numerous instances in which
owners have leveraged their copyright so that future actors were
deterred from engaging in creative activity (consider, for example,
owners of sound recordings who insist that hip-hop artists get a license
in order to sample their works123). That such interactions take place is
unsurprising; copyright is, after all, the legally enforceable right to
preclude others from free riding off the fruits of your creative labor.
But few of these instances involve an owner leveraging a low social
value copyright to do so. Popular sound recording catalogs for
example, do not involve low social value copyrights at all.124 If

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1193283/JK-Rowling-sued-500mplagiarism-lawsuit-family-late-Willy-The-Wizard-author.html.
120
That is, an author who originally creates a work of authorship that happens to
be identical to an earlier one is regarded as not infringing at all. This does not mean
that an author who appropriates protected work without consciousness of the
infringement enjoys any defense. The latter remains actionable, and in that sense
copyright infringement remains a strict liability offense.
121
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring that works of authorship be “original” to merit
copyright protection); see Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 716 (2d Cir.
1991) (Sweet J., dissenting in part) (noting “the fundamental principle of copyright
law that independent creation is never infringement”).
122
35 U.S.C. § 271.
123
E.g., Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir.
2004) (“Get a license or do not sample.”).
124
Some writers have compared the music catalog owners’ demands for licenses
to that of patent trolls, see Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll: The Shady OneMan Corporation That’s Destroying Hip-Hop, Slate.com, Nov. 16, 2006, available
at http://www.slate.com/id/2153961/, but this comparison is inapt. Companies like
Bridgeport Music that acquire catalogues of copyrights do so for the same reason
any music publisher acquires musical works: to negotiate licenses for works in the
owner’s catalog, and to protect against unauthorized use of those works. Such
companies often create value by clearing rights to bodies of work that have become
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anything, just the opposite is typically the case. That a musician has
chosen to sample another’s work proves that the sample has significant
social value. A sample can be effective only to the extent that it is
familiar and well-known, which means that sampled works have
almost invariably achieved both commercial success and broad
popularity—the very definition of a high social value work.125
Other critics have suggested that copyrights used by their
owners in an offensive manner fall into the high private value, low
social value category. Examples include owners of literary estates
who have enforced copyrights in order to keep famous authors’
personal letters private (J.D. Salinger, Richard Wright),126 as well as
Scientologists who have brought copyright suits against former
members to prevent the public release of internal documents relating
to the governance of their religion.127 The former example does not
seem to fit within this category at all; the work of renowned novelists
generates enormous value for society as well as private value for its
author. One might imagine that Scientologists (or any organization,
for that matter), might acquire costly copyrights for the sole purpose of
suppressing critical public dialogue about itself.128 While this use of
copyright may indeed exact some social costs, such uses are relatively
rare, and in any event, their impact is limited due to copyright’s
allowing numerous opportunities to engineer around its exclusive
rights.129
disorganized and conflicted. See Bridgeport Music, 383 F.3d at 394 (discussing
Bridgeport’s work with respect to George Clinton’s catalogue).
125
This does not mean that the strict “license all samples” rule is optimal. It
may well be the case that society is better served by allowing free use of samples to
facilitate second-generation creation. Our point here, though, is merely a descriptive
claim that the copyright in the sampled work belongs in the high social value
category, not the low social value category.
126
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (1991); Salinger v. Random
House, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).
127
See Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm’n Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
128
Or it may well be the case that Scientologists would continue to produce
religious tracts even in the absence of exclusive rights, in which case our theory has
nothing to say about them because they are not responding to the profit motivations
that characterize the basic copyright bargain.
129
These work-arounds are discussed at pp. 39-40, supra. Some critics have
also suggested that there are some high private value works that have low social
value because they are truly pernicious—child pornography or snuff films, for
example. Even if they do belong in this quadrant, such works are typically not
created for private profit but from some other, unsavory motivation, and their
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Ultimately, and most importantly, even if there were any
copyrights in the high private value/low social value quadrant, this
would be irrelevant to our thesis, because the existence of a costly
screens will not affect the production of any high private value
copyright. For the purposes of this discussion, we have defined “high
private value” works as those generating profits in excess of the cost
of the $22,000 copyright screen. Works that fall into this category (if
there are any) will, by definition, generate sufficient private value to
make it worth authors’ time to create them, and will continue to be
produced regardless of whether they are socially suboptimal.130
Authors will create such works, in other words, with or without high
vesting costs. So while we remain skeptical that there are many—or
even any—works of authorship that generate high private value but
low social value, that is not an issue that can be affected by the
presence or absence of costly screens, and thus one that is not
addressed by this paper.
3.

Low private value/low social value copyrights

Low private value, low social value copyrights bring value to
neither their owner nor to society. And thanks to the low threshold
required for copyright vesting, these copyrights are ever more
numerous. At first glance, this seems to create a problem for our
claim that increased process costs would be detrimental to social
welfare. Costly screens cause authors to self-select against the
acquisition of exclusive rights above a given threshold (here, $22,000).
In Part II, we explained that the appeal of costly screens for patent is
that they select against this very category. Why, then, should we not
embrace costly screens in copyright for similar reasons? In this
section, we identify three types of purported low private value, low
social value works that arguably might be eliminated by imposing
substantial process costs as a barrier to vesting exclusive rights, and
show why none of them actually inveigh in favor of that approach.

creation would be unaffected by the presence or absence of screens because creators
of these works do not need exclusive rights to profit from them.
130
See Chris Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s
Downside, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 921, 961-65 (2011) (observing that pornography, even
if socially pernicious, will tend to be produced independently of whether it is
protected by copyright).
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First, many—perhaps most—copyrights in this quadrant are
trivial, in the sense that they have no social impact whatsoever, good
or bad. Copyright arises in any work meeting the low originality
threshold that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, whether the
author wants exclusive rights or not.131 This is why the third quadrant
is so populous. An email written to a friend, a home movie of a family
gathering, or a doodle drawn on the back of a cocktail napkin each get
the same copyright protection as blockbuster Hollywood movies or
bestselling mystery novels, despite the fact that the value of the former
works to their authors or the public are negligible.
Imposing a costly screen as a vesting requirement would
certainly eliminate these copyrights. But who cares? Even if it were
socially beneficial to cut down on these copyrights by imposing a
costly screen (which would certainly work because, after all, no one is
going to pay $22,000 to preserve exclusive rights in a drawing on the
back of a cocktail napkin132), the presence of trivial and inadvertent
copyrights has no impact on our analysis of the implications of costly
screens. The reason is simple: these works may not create any social
value, but neither are they harmful. Rather, they are innocuous
because they will never be enforced in a socially costly way. In fact,
the average layperson probably does not know (and certainly does not
care) that their email or home movie or doodle happens to be
copyrighted, so these rights, however proliferant, cannot have a
deterent effect on future creation. These copyrights could be relegated
to oblivion by costly screens, but society wouldn’t gain anything if
they were.
“Microworks” may also fall into the low private value, low
social value category. Several scholars have expressed concern that
the copyright in very small works of authorship—such as the
individual author contributions that make up the popular online
encyclopedia Wikipedia—will prohibit future creation because the
transaction costs (and litigation fears) associated with using such
material are prohibitively high.133 The concern is that small
copyrights may allow their owners to engage in socially costly but
131

For an interesting narrative illuminating the frequency with which we all
create—and infringe—copyrights on a regular basis, see John Tehranian,
Infringement Nation: Copyright Enforcement and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L.
REV. 537.
132
Unless the author’s name happens to be Picasso.
133
See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 8; Van Houweling, supra note 8.
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privately lucrative holdouts, which has been a major driver of the
anticommons problem in the patent setting.134 Consider, for example,
Wikipedia.135 Every sentence in a given Wikipedia entry could be
copyrighted by a separate author, since the site’s entries are
collaboratively written by many different people. Reproducing a
Wikipedia entry, then, may seem to raise all manner of ex ante
transaction costs (striking licensing deals with numerous owners) or ex
post litigation fears (deriving from numerous acts of infringement
against those owners). For those who share this concern, costly
screens may seem like an ideal way to select against copyrighted
microworks and reduce their multiplication.
Examined more closely, though, this potential benefit of costly
copyrights fails to materialize. Microworks do not present a
significant risk of welfare-diminishing holdouts. This is because the
numerous limitations on owner’s exclusive rights and opportunities for
users to work around those rights that we discussed earlier136 preclude,
or at least starkly limit, the kind of holdout concerns that affect patent
law.137 The example chosen by the authors who have propounded this
concern—Wikipedia138—illustrates the point. First, the likelihood that
the owner of a Wikipedia sentence will sue someone for infringement
seem vanishingly small, both because owners aren’t likely to even
know they have a copyright and because people rarely if ever
contribute to Wikipedia for financial reasons.139 Indeed, Encyclopedia
134

Robert P. Merges, Contracting into liability rules: Intellectual property
rights and collective rights organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (discussing
anticommons-like concerns derived from excess copyright).
135
See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 8 (citing Wikipedia as an example of a
“microwork” that would be socially counterproductive if subject to copyright).
136
See pp. 39-40, supra (discussing copyright’s various limitations and workarounds).
137
Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1175 & n.61 (1999) (“Compared with patent law, copyright law's tragedy of the
anticommons is less costly. The ‘fair use’ doctrine means that copyright holders do
not have the right to exclude nonowners from low-intensity uses of protected
works.”). We stress that this does not necessarily mean that copyright is a “narrow”
ownership interest in some absolute sense, but only that copyright is significantly,
and meaningfully, narrower than patent.
138
Van Houweling, supra note 8 (discussing Wikipedia as an example of a
microwork that may create socially costly holdouts).
139
On the contrary, Wikipedia contributors include material largely in order to
gain fame and/or contribute to a store of knowledge, so they would likely want
others to use their material. See Andrew George, Avoiding Tragedy in the Wiki-
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Britannica never sued individuals for using its materials, and in fact
explicitly permitted such uses in noncommercial settings.140 But even
if it were the case that the owner of the copyright in a Wikipedia
paragraph sued a user for infringement, the defendant would have a
host of plausible statutory defenses. Fair use would be a promising
candidate if, as seems likely, the defendant were using the Wikipedia
microwork in an academic and/or noncommercial setting.141 The
defendant would also possess many plausible alternatives for workarounds. For instance, the idea/expression dichotomy would allow a
defendant to appropriate as much factual information from Wikipedia
as they wanted to, so long as they expressed those facts in an original
manner.142
It remains to consider a third and final copyright that may fall
into the low private value, low social value category. Orphan works
are those whose copyright ownership has become unclear and
prohibitively difficult to trace.143 Creators who wish to use orphan
works find themselves in a double bind. They can use the work,
raising the possibility that the owner will emerge later and demand
exorbitant damages or a crippling injunction. Or they can forego use
in light of these litigation fears. One of the most familiar examples of
orphan works is old newsreel footage. The current owners of the
Commons, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, 33-34 (2007) (discussing the importance of status
among peers as a driver of production among Wikipedians).
140
In fact, Encyclopedia Britannica’s copyright policy explicitly allows for
copying of its material under many circumstances. See Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc.,
Terms of Use, available at http://corporate.britannica.com/termsofuse.html (“You
may display, reproduce, print or download content on the Services only for your
personal, non-commercial use. If you are a teacher, scholar or student, you may copy
reasonable portions of the content for lesson plans, interactive whiteboards, reports,
dissertations, presentations, school newspapers and for similar nonprofit educational
purposes to the extent permitted by applicable law.”).
141
17 U.S.C. § 107 (identifying “scholarship” and “research” as illustrative fair
uses, and indicating that the noncommercial character of a use weighs in favor of fair
use).
142
One might rejoin that there are some facts or ideas so simple that there is
only one way that they can be expressed. To the extent that this is the case,
copyright law again sides with users. The merger doctrine holds that when a fact or
idea is capable of only a single expression, future users are free to copy that
expression, regardless of the owner’s exclusive rights. See, e.g., Schoolhouse, Inc. v.
Anderson, 275 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing merger).
143
For a good overview of the orphan works issue, including summaries of
relevant legislative efforts and other government documents, see U.S. Copyright
Office, Orphan Works Report, available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/.
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rights in decades-old newsreels can rarely be ascertained from the
newsreels themselves, so that documentary filmmakers interested in
using the newsreels must either engage in a costly search to clear
rights to the work, or must use the footage and face the ongoing risk of
costly litigation—all this despite that the newsreel almost certainly no
longer generates much value for its owner.144 And because few of
these copyrights actually earn value for their owners, it may initially
appear that they fall into the low private value, low social value
category, so that imposing costly screens would have the salubrious
effect of eliminating them.
The orphan works problem, and the specter of related nuisance
litigation, raises serious concerns, and has spawned pending legislation
designed to allay the concerns of future creators in order to encourage
the use of these works.145 It is probably the case that orphan works
generate only low private value and low social value now, but this is
irrelevant to our thesis, which concerns only the private and social
value of copyrights at the time of vesting. At the time of their vesting,
newsreels likely generated value for their creators, who licensed them
to be shown before feature films; and for society, who relied on them
for news and entertainment. That these initially valuable works have
since migrated across classes of value from the first (high private
value/high social value) to the third (low private value/low social
value) quadrant does not relate to our investigation into how screens
affect the initial decision to acquire a copyright. Indeed, if our
conjecture that most orphan works were initially both socially and
privately valuable is correct, then it is likely that they would still be
created even if the costs of acquiring a copyright were raised
significantly.146

144

See LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 98 (2004) (discussing orphan works as a
hurdle to the creation of documentary films).
145
E.g., Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 2008, S.2913 (Sept. 27, 2008);
see also generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 22 (2006),
available at http:// www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report.pdf.
146
We stress that the concerns we raise about process costs at the outset of
copyright vesting do not warrant skepticism about formalities that arise after
copyright vesting. Indeed, such proposals appear to impose process costs in a way
that do not raise the specter of deterring the creation of socially valuable works, and
may well be a good idea.
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Low private value/high social value copyrights

The fourth and final category of copyrights contains those that
generate positive value for the public, but only little value for their
owners. With patents, this quadrant did not concern us because it was
largely empty. By contrast, there are numerous low private value,
high social value copyrights, and as a result the dynamics of costly
screens operate quite differently in this setting.
It may initially seem counterintuitive that a work could create
significant value for society while the associated copyright could fail
to create correlative high value for its owner. This is, as we have
shown, essentially never the case with patents. But particularly as
compared to patent, copyright law’s narrow ownership entitlements
allow owners to internalize much less of the overall value that their
work generates.147 This imbalance between the capacity of works of
authorship to create positive externalities—“spillovers” in Frischmann
and Lemley’s phrasing148—and the incapacity of copyrights to accrue
that value for owners means that copyright generates a great deal of
works whose social value is significant despite earning relatively little
private value for its author. Indeed, a copyright must generate
significant social value if the relatively smaller amount of that value
that owners can internalize is going to provide authors sufficient
incentive to create.
In a world animated by our hypothetical costly screen, then,
when the amount of value authors can extract from a given copyright
falls below $22,000, authors will typically not create the associated
work, regardless of whether that outcome is bad for the public.149
147

See supra Part III.B.2.
See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 111 (referring to positive externalities
created by intellectual property generally as “spillovers”).
149
We do not mean to discount the possibility that authors will create for
reasons unrelated to copyright. Some works are created not for profit, but simply
because the author wants to share an idea with the world (this article is one of them).
See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006) (discussing
non-market production of creative work); but cf. Lior Strahilevitz, Wealth Without
Markets?, 116 YALE L.J. 1472 (2007) (expressing skepticism about Benkler’s
enthusiasm for non-market production).
Other authors may create work
independently of the existence of copyright because they are incentivized by
subcultural norms rather than formal exclusive rights. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar & Chris
Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual
Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787,
148
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Costly screens would thus suppress production of low private value,
high social value copyrights, causing society to bear the losses that
result when such works go unproduced. Consider three categories of
copyrights that would be especially vulnerable to costly screens. First
are “thinly” copyrighted works, like phone directories, information
databases, or any useful compilation of facts.150 Copyright law
already limits the profitability of these fact-intensive works, extending
to them slender exclusive rights limited only their original selection or
arrangement of facts.151 Because creators of data compilations already
face limited profit margins, costly screens would be particularly likely
to preclude their production.
Second, consider creators who require numerous copyrights to
protect their exclusive rights. A freelance news photographer, for
example, may take hundreds of pictures in a week, depending on
exclusive rights in all of them just to make sure that the few that are
used are used with permission and for a fee.152 Freelance writers work
1790 (2008) (showing that stand-up comedians create jokes independently of
copyright’s incentives).
Such authors will continue to create works regardless of costly screens, but
because of this—indeed, because such authors are largely indifferent to copyright—
they are not a class of creators that is relevant to our thesis. As we explained at the
outset, costly screen theory can explain only those actors who create copyrights out
of a desire for financial reward. And because this economic incentivist model is the
core premise of the U.S. intellectual property system, our thesis retains substantial
leverage even in the presence of works motivated by other than pecuniary gain.
And as the examples we discuss in this section illustrate, most works in the low
private value/high social value quadrant are created out of at least some desire for
profit. This is certainly true of thinly copyrighted works like directories or works
that require numerous copyrights like news photos; no author makes either of these
kinds of works purely from creative desire. And while we can imagine that some
authors would pen brilliant works even knowing they would be commercial failures,
most authors write in the hope of earning at least enough to make a living. This
explains why even now almost all authors of significant literary works seek to
publish their books for profit, rather than simply making them available for free on
the internet.
150
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.35 (2001) (discussing thinly copyrighted works).
151
E.g., Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)
(holding that copyright in factual compilations is limited to originality in selection or
arrangement of facts).
152
Much the same is true of freelance writers, or (differently) of television news
stations that produce numerous separately copyrighted broadcasts in any given day.
Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 100 at 29 (discussing the unique difficulties vesting costs
would impose on authors who depend on the creation of multiple works).
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on a similar model, and would be loath to shop their work around to
publishing outlets in the absence of some legal recourse against use
without permission. In a slightly different vein are authors who create
a very high number of distinct works on a regular basis, such as
television news stations, which create numerous separate broadcasts
daily. In a world requiring a $22,000 threshold for copyright vesting,
the price of protecting multiple works would skyrocket for each of
these authors. Less well-capitalized actors, such as impecunious
freelance writers or photographers, would likely be priced out of their
profession. And only broadcast news stations that were parts of
wealthy conglomerates would be able to sustain the costs of associated
copyrights, driving smaller-scale news outlets out of the business.
Finally, and most saliently, consider the socially valuable work
that is nevertheless a commercial failure for its copyright owner.
George Lucas may be the emblematic owner for whom the copyright
system works ideally, but he is also the exception rather than the rule.
The relationship between the true quality and the commercial appeal
of a work of authorship is weak at best, and this disparity is
exacerbated by the extent to which copyright’s relatively narrow scope
limits owners’ abilities to internalize the social value—positive
externalities—created by their works. One example of the brilliant
commercial failure is the work whose true value is only understood
well after its publication. Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick is widely
considered one of the great American novels, but sold so miserably
that its author had to abandon writing to seek an income elsewhere.153
Vincent Van Gogh’s paintings are some of the most original and
influential in history. Yet no one wanted them during Van Gogh’s
life,154 although today they are valued at tens of millions of dollars in
current art markets.155 Many less famous works also generate social
value well in excess of the private value they accrue for owners. Films
may fail at the box office, but introduce influential tropes and concepts
that are unprotected (and therefore unprofitable for owners)156 because
they amount to unprotectable ideas.157 Academic treatises rarely earn
153

ANDREW DELBANCO, MELVILLE: HIS WORLD AND WORK (2005).
A baker famously said to Van Gogh, “No more bread,” when Van Gogh
again tried to trade paintings for food.
155
http://www.theartwolf.com/10_expensive.htm.
156
The Marx Brothers’ “Duck Soup” (1933) is now considered their best and
most highly influential work, but was a critical and commercial failure.
http://www.filmsite.org/duck.html.
157
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (ideas are not copyrightable).
154
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significant profits for their authors,158 though they too may generate
highly socially valuable insights about their subject matters. And
many non-famous artists sell paintings for modest prices that could
well understate the social value in terms of aesthetic pleasure that
those works generate.
In our current world, where copyright arise automatically,
artists need not negotiate any screens in order to secure rights in their
works. They thus remain freer to experiment, taking shots with
innovative works that promise to push the envelope of artistic or
literary expression, even if the attempt is not that commercially
successful, perhaps in the hope that their ideas will catch fire and
make them millionaires. But in a world where securing a copyright
requires a heavy front-end payment of $22,000, the possibility of
commercial failure will deter many such innovative creators. Realistic
creators will likely balk at the idea of having to invest additional tens
of thousands of dollars in work that is not likely to recoup even the
cost of the screen. And while wildly optimistic authors might be
inclined to invest in a costly copyright despite their low chances of
success, they may well lack the funds to do it. Of course, third party
companies like publishing houses or movie studios could step in to
finance costly copyrights, as they finance other costs of creation. But
in a world where such intermediaries were necessary, the resulting
creative products would likely be those calculated to maximize the
intermediaries’ profits rather than to generate positive but not
internalizable spillover benefits like innovative ideas or novel artistic
forms.
Even if copyright owners were required to navigate costly
screens for their exclusive rights to vest, many copyrights would arise,
and creative work would persist. Lucasfilms would still make Star
Wars movies despite $22,000 worth of process costs, because it will
still earn scads of cash, and even though it cannot charge a royalty
every time someone says “May the force be with you.” But the
indifference of wealthy and institutional creators to costly screens
should not cause us to dismiss the effect of those screens on less wellcapitalized creators. The less privately remunerative copyrights that
costly screens would deter do not necessarily create less social value
than their privately lucrative counterparts. Requiring copyright
158

One of us can personally attest to this point. See ROBERT LIND & DAVID
FAGUNDES, COPYRIGHT Q&A (LexisNexis 2010).
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owners to bear the costs of a cumbersome process prior to vesting
would inflict heavy, though not obvious, costs on the public as well.
*

*

*

Copyrights array very differently than patents across the four
classes of value because they are constructed differently, and more
narrowly, than patents.. The first quadrant—high private value/high
social value—is heavily populated with familiar examples of
commercially successful works. The second quadrant—high private
value/low social value—lies empty, because copyrights that produce
only low social value likely cannot allow their authors enough
leverage to extract meaningful private value. The third quadrant—low
private value/low social value—is heavily populated, albeit with
largely innocuous copyrights. The final quadrant—low private
value/high social value—is crowded as well, with copyrights that are
valuable for society but do not allow their authors to extract enough
value to clear the price of a costly screen.
We summarize these relationships in Table 4 below:
Table 4: Social and Private Values of Various Copyright Classes
High social value

Low or negative
social value

High
private
value

Commercially valuable,
socially popular
copyrights (Star Wars
films; Harry Potter books)

vanishingly few

Low
private
value

Thin copyrights
(directories,
compilations); valuable
commercial failures;
iterative copyrights

“Microworks;” trivial and
inadvertent works

As this chart illustrates, the second and fourth quadrants of the
copyright grid are populated inversely to the patent setting. While
there are many high private value/low social value patents and few
low private value/high social value patents, just the opposite is the
case with copyright. As a result, application of costly screens in
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copyright would be counterproductive rather than beneficial. If
copyright vesting required navigation of a process costing about as
much as patent examination does, a crucial class of authors would be
systematically deterred from creating. Those authors seeking to make
works that promise enormous social benefits but only paltry private
ones would simply decline to produce such works, regardless of the
lost public benefits. Of course, one might point out that these social
costs might are be offset by the other effect of a costly screen:
selecting against low private value, low social value copyrights. But
as we have seen, most low private value, low social value works are
simply innocuous rather than socially harmful, so that the benefits of
reducing them would be negligible. It is for these reasons, we believe,
that the copyright system is sensibly devoid of high vesting costs.
IV.

COSTLY SCREENS IN BROADER CONTEXT

Refracting copyright and patent through the lens of costly
screen analysis provides related insights about each of these fields. It
explains why the dearth of process prior to copyright vesting and the
burdensome process accompanying patent grants are each more
beneficial than the current literature suggests. In this Part, we observe
two points beyond our core insight about the efficiency of the present
IP vesting system. First, we propose a unified theory of IP process
that draws on our earlier discussion of costly screens to explain why
law places such disparate hurdles in the paths of patent and copyright
owners. Second, we look at other legal contexts whose administrative
structures (or lack thereof) can be illuminated by the efficiency (or
inefficiency) of costly screens.
A.

A Unified Theory of IP Process

Many writers have sought to explain why patents arise only
after a cumbersome examination process, while copyrights vest
immediately upon fixation without any process at all. Prior analyses
have looked to the differential scope of the rights conferred by patent
and copyright law;159 the divergent social aims of the two fields;160 the
159

Dale P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 MO. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983) (arguing
that because patent is a broader—and more potentially socially costly—right than
copyright, there should be more barriers to its vesting). We distinguish our theory
from Olson’s infra at 53-55.
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relative difficulty of evaluating the quality of the subject matter
protected by patent versus copyright;161 and the incentives created by
the different degrees of searching required for each of the rights to
vest.162 Yet these numerous attempts, scholars have yet to provide a
persuasive explanation for the puzzling disparity between these two
systems.163
The costly screening model we have developed here provides
the most coherent account of the divergent methods by which patents
and copyrights are awarded. In contrast to the foregoing theories,
which seek to explain IP’s vesting disparities in terms of the different
subject matter governed by each system, we offer a unified theory of
the administrative processes surrounding intellectual property—a
theory of “IP process”—centered on the costs of those processes. Our
theory is based on the relative strengths of the intellectual property
rights awarded, but not in the most obvious sense. Patents are not
examined simply because they involve stronger property rights and
thus could do more damage than copyrights if granted imprudently.
Copyrights do not arise merely upon fixation in a tangible medium of
expression only because they are weaker rights that pose little threat if
they spring into being haphazardly and easily. Such a simplistic
explanation cannot account for the fact that patent examination is
highly unreliable—the PTO grants many invalid patents—yet has been
allowed to persist. If patents (and not copyrights) are examined purely
because improperly granted patents can cause harm, the current system
is surely failing.
The effect of these differences between patents and copyrights
is, instead, indirect. The strength of the intellectual property right
160

1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.2.1, at
63-64 (1989) (arguing that patent seeks only to encourage efficient production of
information, while copyright seeks to encourage as much information production as
possible, requiring more limits on the creation of patents).
161
Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV.
465, 469-70, 487-89 (2004) (arguing that it makes more sense to have barriers to the
creation of patents because their subject matter is susceptible to objective judgments,
while works of authorship are relatively more subjective).
162
John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 119, 146-47 (1991) (arguing that the barriers associated with patent encourage
more searching, causing researchers to learn more and refine their work more
carefully).
163
For an excellent discussion of each of these explanations and how they fail to
fully explain the differences between the two systems, see Jeanne Fromer, A
Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (2010).
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defines the various classes of value that each entitlement will create.
Because patent rights are broad, low private value/high social value
patents do not exist. A patent would allow an inventor to capture
much of the benefit from any patent that created significant social
value. Similarly, because copyrights are narrow, high private
value/low social value copyrights do not exist—they are too easy to
engineer around. On the other hand, low private value/high social
value copyrights are plentiful.
Accordingly, costly screens embedded within the patent and
copyright systems will disproportionately select against different
classes of intellectual property rights, by affecting how and whether
those rights vest in the first instance. In the patent context, there exists
a good argument for costly screens. Due to the distinctive value
asymmetries created by the relative strength of patent as a property
right, screens preclude only the production of inventions that create
zero or negative social value. Inventions that create high social value
but generate little value for their owners exist in negligible numbers at
best, so denying them patents by using costly screens does not reduce
social welfare.
But copyright presents a different story. The prevalence of low
private value/high social value works suggests that imposing screens
as a precondition to the acquisition of copyright would be
counterproductive. The costlier the screen, the more likely it is that
authors will decline to create works where they are skeptical of
clearing the value of the screen. In copyright, unlike in patent,
erecting costly screens as a prerequisite to vesting raises serious
concerns about precluding the creation of works that are enriching for
society even though they generate little value for their authors.
Once the current system of patent examination—as well as a
hypothetical system of copyright examination or fees—is understood
as a costly screen, the final piece of this puzzle falls into place. The
breadth of the patent right creates an asymmetry that the costly patent
screen exploits in a way that creates social welfare; the comparatively
narrow copyright creates an asymmetry that would interact with a
costly screen in ways likely harmful to social welfare. The breadth of
the intellectual property right defines the appropriate shape—and
cost—of the process used to bestow it.
This is, at one level, a descriptive claim: The reason that
patent and copyright have such different vesting thresholds is that
these vesting thresholds select differently across the different classes
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of value created by patent (a broader right) and copyright (a weaker
one). But this descriptive claim is inextricable from our normative
argument. Our theory of IP process works because patent’s costly
screens and copyright’s lack of them encourage invention and creation
at a socially beneficial level. This theory thus implies that the current
patent and copyright systems are both unfairly maligned, albeit in very
different ways. The standard account is that patent places too many
expensive roadblocks in the way of acquiring exclusive rights,164 while
copyright has a problematically low vesting threshold.165 Costly
screen theory, and in particular, our theory of IP process, demonstrates
why each of these systems may in fact be much closer to optimal than
is typically believed.
We hasten to add that we do not mean to claim that the
congressional architects of the intellectual property system intended or
understood this result. The patent examination and copyright
registration systems most likely arose for other reasons, or through
historical accident.166 But it would be odd to imagine that these
systems could persist through two centuries if they did not lead to
improvements in societal well-being.167 Our theory of IP process,
animated by the idea of costly screens, shows that this is likely the
case. There is a deep relationship between how statutory rights in
information are constructed and what kind of process is optimal to
govern the vesting of those rights.

164

See, e.g., supra note 41 (noting Mossoff and Kieff suggestions for reform).
See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 99 at 221-31 (arguing for reintroduction of
formalities in order to weed out socially negative copyrights); cf., e.g., Sprigman,
supra note 104, at 517 (suggesting that registration should be a prerequisite for
property-rule enforcement of copyright infringement); LESSIG, supra note 98, at 11726 (discussing the Public Domain Enhancement Act).
166
There is a straightforward historical story to be told about this divergence, of
course. The modern PTO grew out of the Patent Board established by the Patent Act
of 1790. The lack of formalities required for copyrights to vest reflects international
norms brought to bear on U.S. law by our obligations under the Berne Convention.
Neither of these narratives, however, provides an explanation of why patent and
copyright processes have developed in such different ways.
167
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5, at 614-15
(5th ed. 1998) (arguing that the common law has evolved towards efficiency).
165
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Process Costs and Cognate Fields
1.

Beneficially Costly Law Systems

Our argument that costly screens are beneficial for the patent
system rested on the premise that while the examination process is
substantively ineffective, it still produces value by forcing applicants
to select against seeking patents that have only low private value. And
because of patent’s distinctive asymmetry—namely, that there are no
or vanishingly few patents of low private value that also generate high
social value—this effect is on-balance positive for social welfare. In
this Subpart, we abstract this insight onto the law more generally,
identifying two cognate fields characterized by high process costs, and
showing why those processes—typically criticized as excessively
cumbersome—may be more socially beneficial than is commonly
thought.
Begin with due process protections. Many employees may
only be fired “for good cause,” either as a matter of contract or state or
federal law.168 Employers seeking to discharge an employee subject to
these protections typically must provide employees with hearings
before neutral arbiters and show that good cause for termination
exists.169 Employers have certain advantages in these hearings,
particularly repeat-player status and the resources to hire attorneys.170
At the same time, they also bear some asymmetric costs: they must

168

See, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-7012 (2007) (“Except as is otherwise provided in this
Division, no deputy sheriff in the County Police Department, no full-time deputy
sheriff not employed as a county police officer or county corrections officer and no
employee in the County Department of Corrections shall be removed, demoted or
suspended except for cause, upon written charges filed with the Board by the Sheriff
and a hearing before the Board thereon upon not less than 10 days' notice at a place
to be designated by the chairman thereof.”).
169
See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Board of Regents
of States Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
170
Cf. Guido Calabresi & Jeffrey O. Cooper, New Directions in Tort Law, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 863-64 (1996); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95, 97
(1974). In some instances, employees will be represented by collective bargaining
units who are also repeat players, which may serve to mitigate these advantages to
some extent.
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often create and fund the hearing board,171 and they must pay
employee wages during hearing pendency (and often cannot recover
those wages if they are victorious at the hearing).172 Numerous critics
have suggested that such hearings do little but counterproductively
raise employers’ costs,173 but this ignores their costly screening
function. Forcing employers to bear the costs of termination hearings
causes them to select against terminations that are not worth the
administrative trouble—a private decision that the employer is in the
best position to make. Moreover, the asymmetries at play in this
context mirror those at play in patents. Few terminations will generate
high social value but only low private value for employers (indeed,
such an example is hard to imagine). More likely, if it is worth an
employer’s time and trouble to navigate the thicket of a due process
hearing, society will also benefit—an employee that bad is almost
certainly inflicting general social costs as well.
Consider also housing evictions. Landlords may not exercise
self-help and summarily lock out tenants who breach their leases.174
Rather, tenants are entitled to summary eviction proceedings175 that
tend to advantage and disadvantage landlords for the same reasons as
termination hearings: landlords enjoy helpful repeat-player status, but
have to bear costs associated with eviction.176 Many critics have
argued that this procedure is prohibitively costly for landlords, who
have to bear most of the costs of the process despite the tenant’s being
delinquent,177 as well as tenants, whose involvement in eviction
proceedings can be located by future landlords, permanently tainting
171

See, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-7003 (2007) (stating that each Illinois county is
responsible for paying the salary and expenses of the members of the boards
established to conduct due process hearings for county employees).
172
Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (“[T]ermination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient
of the very means by which to live while he waits.”).
173
See, e.g., Ellis v. Sheahan, 412 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2005) (Posner, J.)
(suggesting such an arrangement).
174
See Jessie Dukeminier et al., Property 382–408 (6th ed. 2006).
175
See, e.g., A and M Towing and Recovery, Inc. v. Guay, 282 Conn. 434
(2007); Lowell Housing Authority v. Melendez, 449 Mass. 34 (2007); Hughes v.
Sanders, 847 So. 2d 165 (La. App. Ct. 2003).
176
In California, for example, even where landlords successfully show cause for
eviction, they must remove the tenant’s belongings from the premises and place it in
a storage facility—at their own expense.
177
See Chicago Board of Realtors v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 741 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.).
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their chances of obtaining housing.178 Here, too, though, this critical
scholarship fails to take into account the costly-screen function of
eviction proceedings. The process costs imposed by summary
evictions function as a helpful information-forcing device, causing
landlords to limit their evictions only to those tenants whose
delinquency is so privately costly that it exceeds the costs of eviction
itself—an assessment that landlords are uniquely well-suited to make.
Moreover, it is hard to imagine that there will be any evictions that
generate low benefits to landlords but high benefits to society at large;
the low private value/high social value quadrant of the grid is
empty.179 A tenant troublesome enough to make a landlord undergo
an eviction proceeding is likely to be making life difficult for others as
well (by making noise or violating failing to keep up the premises, for
example). It is entirely possible, then, that the process costs of
summary evictions generate significant social welfare via their
screening function.
2.

Beneficially Costless Law Systems

Just as our process costs approach to patents explains how
other complex administrative procedures generate unappreciated
benefits, our costly screen analysis of copyright illuminates how at
least one area of law, prior restraints on speech, is notable for a
178

See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous
Feedback, at 17–19.
179
A full analysis of this question is well beyond the scope of this paper, but
there is a plausible story to be told that eviction valuations function in precisely this
way. Any high social value eviction—for instance, the eviction of a disruptive
tenant who is violent and engaged in illegal activity—likely holds high private value
as well; the disruption strikes most heavily at other nearby tenants who are often
under the auspices of the same landlord. The paradigmatic low private value/low
social value eviction might be a tenant who is not disruptive but is delinquent on
rent; turning such a tenant out onto the street might lead to crime and social
disruption. This is the category of eviction against which a costly screen will select.
The danger posed by such a screening mechanism is that tenants will exploit the
procedural costs involved with eviction by breaching their leases in minor ways, up
to the point of making eviction worthwhile. Like any transaction cost, then, the
costly screen could inhibit efficiency-enhancing transactions by enabling
unnecessary bad behavior. Nonetheless, this danger may be less pronounced in
residential housing than in other contexts. Tenants are likely to be highly risk
averse—the downside risk of miscalculating and being evicted is substantial, and
renters are often people with little margin to spare—and thus less inclined to push
their luck.
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striking absence of administrative procedure may have an internal
logic beyond what commentators have typically appreciated.
The United States has a long tradition of opposition to
blocking speech before its release to the public, instead preferring to
allow speakers to interact freely in the belief that an unfettered
exchange of ideas is the best way to encourage democratic dialogue.180
As a result, courts have been particularly skeptical of anything that
looks like a licensing procedure for speech.181 Licenses for the press
(which were common in colonial America) are per se illegal,182 and
state action that even resembles licensure of speech (licenses for
parades, and even regulation of vanity license plates) has been
invalidated.183
There are well-rehearsed constitutional and prudential reasons
for the per se rule against prior restraints,184 though some writing has
cast doubt on the latter.185 Here, we seek to advance an additional
rationale for the rule against prior restraints that is rooted in process
costs.
If courts permitted licensure of speech, the resulting
administrative apparatus would cause would-be speakers to limit
speech only to instances where the private value of their speech was
greater than the cost of a license. In many cases, this would be
socially costless, where the speech at issue generated only low social
180

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (roundly rejecting prior restraint).
Maryland v. Freedman, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (invalidating licensing scheme
requiring approval from municipal board as precondition of permission to license
showing of films).
182
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975)
(“The presumption against prior restraints is heavier—the degree of protection
broader—than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties.”).
183
E.g., MacDonald v. Safir, 26 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (invalidating
parade permit system as impermissible prior restraint); Sons of Confederate Veterans
v. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles of Virginia, 288 F.3d 610 (4th Cir. 2002) (invalidating
restrictions on license plates for heritage organization).
184
E.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central
Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 16 (1981) (arguing that prior restraints are worse than
other kinds of speech restrictions because they induce self-censorship, expand the
scope of government control over expression, and delay the dissemination of
speech).
185
See Randy Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539
(1977) (questioning whether prior restraints actually are a uniquely pernicious form
of speech regulation); cf. generally CASS SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS (2009)
(questioning the idea that more speech is always better by observing that misleading
and inflammatory speech can cause mass misperceptions and undermine democratic
dialogue).
181

COSTLY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

61

value as well (it is, after all, easy to ignore annoying or inane speech).
But it is possible, as with copyright, to imagine numerous instances
where speech has relatively low private value (because it may not be
particularly remunerative) but high social value (because the public
finds it inspiring, or edifying, or beautiful). This is because speech,
like works of authorship subject to copyright, creates
disproportionately high positive externalities—aesthetic enjoyment,
intellectual insights—that cannot be recouped by its creator.
Take, for instance, street performers. Sure, most of them are
terrible, but they can be easily tuned out or walked past, so those that
create low social value are basically innocuous. Some street
performers are pretty good, though, and bring value by making city
streets more colorful and giving passersby a brief moment of aesthetic
pleasure. Regardless of whether they create low or high social value,
though, almost all street performers make little enough that a licensing
requirement would put them out of business.186
Much the same is true of publicly distributed flyers. While
most of them deservedly go straight to the trash, some of them may
articulate important and creative ideas. Our own American Revolution
was affected to a nontrivial extent by ideas propounded in publicly
distributed, privately made pamphlets.187 But making flyers for
indiscriminate public consumption is hardly a highly remunerative
endeavor, so if such speech were subject to a costly license, it would
likely be stamped out, along with the social value it creates. So as
each of these examples illustrate, the costs of screening out speech of
low private value but high social value would overbear any trivial
advantages of eliminating low private value, low social value speech,
which suggests that speech licensure exacts net social welfare costs,
independently of whether it is constitutionally suspect.

186

Popular folk singer Tracy Chapman was discovered by her record label while
performing
for
spare
change
in
Harvard
Square,
see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tracy_Chapman, but she’s the commercially successful
exception that proves the rule.
187
An example is Thomas Paine’s Common Sense (1776), which challenged the
authority of the British Crown at a crucial time in late colonial America. The text of
this
pamphlet
is
available
at
http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/commonsense/text.html.
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CONCLUSION
Patents do not come cheaply to applicants. Copyrights, on the
other hand, arise costlessly, frequently, and even unintentionally. The
stark contrast between the onerous patent examination process and the
easy, instantaneous vesting of copyrights seems puzzling. These
systems have also drawn criticism as causing valueless copyrights to
proliferate while placing unnecessary burdens on patentees.
Examining this problem through the prism of costly screen theory
helps to make sense of the difference between these very different
systems for vesting property rights in information, and reveals one
reason that these much-maligned processes may not be as problematic
as they are commonly described.
While navigating cumbersome patent examination process can
exact social costs, it also has the advantage of eliminating low social
value patents (while precluding the creation of no or few high social
value patents). Copyright’s screenlessness, on the other hand, may
permit the creation of numerous low social value copyrights, but these
copyrights are relatively innocuous, and the ease of vesting assures the
continued creation of high social value copyrights that would be
eliminated by the imposition of costly process prior to vesting. Our
analysis points in the direction of a unified theory of IP process, one
that illuminates the foundational connection between how law
structures intellectual property rights and how that structure
necessitates particular processes for granting those rights.
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